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INTRODUCTION
In November 2004, New York's prominent Attorney General (and now
Governor) Eliot Spitzer accused insurance broker Marsh & McLennan of
defrauding its clients by accepting "contingent commissions."' Contingent
commissions are bonuses that insurers pay to brokers and independent agents
(collectively "independent intermediaries" or "producers") for bringing the
insurer a particularly large volume of profitable customers. 2 Since Spitzer's
initial attack on contingent commissions, his office has parlayed similar
accusations 3 into six settlement agreements with major insurance industry
companies, twenty guilty pleas from these companies' executives and officers,
and approximately $3 billion in restitution and penalties. 4 According to the
latest count, more than twenty states have opened their own investigations into
misconduct in the insurance industry.5 And seven states, with more expected to
follow, have passed legislation to combat the types of practices Spitzer
6uncovered. Federal officials have monitored these responses closely, with
some suggesting that they expose fundamental problems with lodging
insurance regulation at the state-rather than federal-level. In short, during
the last two years contingent commissions have caused a scandal unparalleled
1. Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Investigation Reveals Widespread Corruption
in Insurance Industry (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/oct/
oct 14a_04.html.
2. See J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries, 73 J.
RISK & INS. 359, 375 (2006).
3. The prominence of Spitzer's initial attack on contingent commissions is partially attributable to
the fact that employees at Marsh & McClellan had solicited purposefully inflated price quotations from
some insurers. This "bid rigging" allowed Marsh to steer its clients to particular insurers by falsely
convincing them that the insurer had prevailed in a competitive process of price quotation. The sole
benefit to Marsh, and its guilty employees, was the receipt of additional contingent commissions. See
Sean M. Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the Way to Insurance Market Reform, 74
FORDHAM L. REv. 3041, 3046-47 (2006). Subsequent investigations, however, have revealed that
Marsh's undeniably fraudulent practice of bid-rigging was isolated to a small number of the giant
insurance broker's employees; bid-rigging was not, as initially seemed plausible, widespread among
insurance brokers and insurers in the property-casualty industry. See id.
4. Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Ace Settles Bid-Rigging Probe; Agreement Is
Part of Ongoing Effort To Restore Competition in Insurance Industry (Apr. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/apr/apr26a_06.html.
5. Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3050 n.39.
6. Id. at 3064.
7. See R.J. Lehmann, Specter Grills Witnesses on Bid Rigging Prosecutions, BESTWIRE, June 21,
2006.
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in the history of the property-casualty insurance industry.
8
According to critics of the practice, contingent commissions create a
conflict of interest for ostensibly independent intermediaries. Unlike ordinary
premium-based commissions, which are a fixed percentage of an individual
insurance customer's premiums, contingent commissions are paid to
intermediaries based on the volume and profitability of business they refer to
insurers. 9 The size and structure of the contingent commissions that insurers
offer to intermediaries therefore vary significantly. This variability means that
intermediaries can often increase their commissions by "steering" clients to
insurers that provide suboptimal coverage for their customers' needs.'
0
Despite the recent controversy surrounding contingent commissions, these
payments and similar performance-based commissions remain common in most
property-casualty insurance markets." Contingent commissions are ubiquitous
among independent insurance agents, who provide 40% of ordinary consumers
with insurance products covering their homes, automobiles, or small
businesses.' 2 Contingent commissions are also widely used in insurance
markets involving sophisticated insurance purchasers-where brokers rather
than agents are the dominant type of intermediary.' 3 Although each of the four
largest insurance brokers have disclaimed contingent commissions in response
8. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3041.
9. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 379.
10. Complaint at 7-8, State v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., No. 04403342 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 14,
2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/oct/octl4a 04_attachi.pdf [hereinafter Marsh
Complaint].
11. See J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., CONTINGENT INSURANCE COMMISSIONS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 2 (2005), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/contingent_
commissionsstudy.PDF.
12. Id. at 4 ("[C]ontingent arrangements exist in most lines of insurance sold to consumers .... In
personal auto and homeowners insurance, agent-based insurers cover about 40 percent of the market.").
Captive agents or direct writers, both of whom sell only a single insurer's policies, obviously do not
receive contingent commissions.
13. In theory, independent agents and brokers differ in the extent to which they are legal agents of
the policyholder or the insurer. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 56-57 (3d
ed. 2000); 7 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D: LAW OF INSURANCE
AGENTS § 47.5, at 326 (1998). Insurance brokers are typically described as general legal agents of the
insurance consumer who are free to place the consumer's business with whatever insurer the consumer
or broker chooses, whereas independent insurance agents ostensibly function as independent contractors
who sell the products of multiple different insurers. See ABRAHAM, supra, at 56-57. In practice, the
difference between these two types of intermediaries is often hazy at best. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE
LAW AND POLICY 66 (2003); Colin Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability:
Crossing the Two Way Street, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 237, 238 (2002). Indeed, several states have
abandoned the distinction between agents and brokers altogether. See HOLMES, supra, § 47.6, at 338;
Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3054 (noting Connecticut as one example). To the extent that there is a
meaningful practical distinction between these two intermediaries, it is that brokers tend to serve
relatively sophisticated clients, whereas agents tend to serve less sophisticated ordinary consumers. See
Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3055. It is this latter distinction-based on the level of sophistication of the
insurance purchaser-that is relevant for the purposes of policy analysis. Consequently, this Article
structures its analysis around consumer sophistication rather than the agent/broker distinction.
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to pressure from Spitzer's office, 14 the majority of brokers have refused to do
so. 5 And a handful of insurers that currently claim to have abandoned
contingent commissions have merely adopted "supplemental compensation"
arrangements, which retain the same performance-based contingency structure
that generates the underlying conflict of interest. 6  In effect, such
"supplemental compensation arrangements" are contingent commissions by a
different name.'7
Independent insurance intermediaries defend their continued receipt of
contingent commissions by arguing that competition can adequately address the
payments' potential dangers.' 8 To date, this argument has apparently convinced
state regulators and legislatures: the vast majority of reform proposals permit
contingent commissions so long as they are adequately disclosed. 19 And each of
the approximately half-dozen states that has enacted reforms has merely
imposed disclosure requirements. Indeed, Spitzer himself has suggested that
contingent commissions might be acceptable in some parts of the industry if
14. Aside from Marsh, these are Willis Group Holdings Ltd., Aon Corporation, and Arthur J.
Gallagher & Co. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 365 tbl.2; see also Press Release, Arthur J.
Gallagher & Co., Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Announces Subpoena from Connecticut Attorney General,
Elimination of Volume & Profit Based Contingent Commissions, and Third Quarter 2004 Financial
Results (Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://media.corporateir.net/mediafiles/irol/10/104111/
AJGQ3_2004_EamingsRelease.pdf; Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Aon Settles
Corruption Probe: Leading Insurance Broker Agrees To Pay $190 Million and Adopt Sweeping Reforms
(Mar. 4, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/mar/marO4a_05.html; Press Release,
Office of the N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Insurance Broker Agrees to Sweeping Reforms: Marsh To Pay $850
Million in Restitution and Ban Contingent Commissions (Jan. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/jan/marshsettlement-pr.pdf; Press Release, Willis Group
Holdings, Willis Group Holdings To End Practice of Contingency Agreements with Insurance Carriers
(Oct. 21, 2004), available at http://www.willis.com/news/news-attachments/end-Contingency.pdf.
15. See David Dwanka, Mid-Level Insurance Brokers Defend Contingent Commissions Amid
Growing Criticism, BESTWIRE, May 8, 2006.
16. See Sally Roberts, Compensation Shake-Up Continues; Chubb Pays $17M, Ends All
Contingents, Bus. INS., Dec. 25, 2006, at 1; Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Nation's
Largest Disability Insurer Agrees to Sweeping Reforms: UnumProvident To Eliminate Contingent
Commissions; Fully Disclose Broker Compensation (Nov. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/nov/novOlaO6.html.
17. Accordingly, this Article uses the term "contingent commission" to encompass "supplemental
compensation" agreements. Cf Roberts, supra note 16, at I (noting that the Chubb agreement states that
"'a fixed commission paid to a producer, set prior to the sale of a particular insurance product, and that
may be based on, among other things, the prior year's performance of the producer' is not considered a
contingent compensation"). For more on the distinctive issues that supplemental compensation
arrangements pose, see infra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
18. See Dwanka, supra note 15.
19. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3050 n.39 (noting that over twenty states have opened
investigations into contingent commissions as of May 2006, and that "[liegislative and administrative
market reform efforts have targeted disclosure of compensation received by insurance producers, as
opposed to proscribing contingent commissions themselves"). These disclosure requirements do not
require disclosing the size of the contingent commissions associated with a particular transaction.
Indeed, such disclosure might well be impossible given that contingent commissions are calculated at
year's end.
20. See id. at 3064. Many of the most important states for insurers, including California and New
York, have not yet adopted reforms. Id.
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insurers informed consumers about their existence.
2 1
Significantly, academic commentary has supported this disclosure-based
response to contingent commission schemes. The most notable claim in the
extant literature is that because contingent commissions are based on insurers'
profitability, they encourage producers to inform insurers about the risk
characteristics of potential purchasers ("insureds") in ways that would
otherwise be impossible.22 Some have therefore concluded that contingent
commissions can help consumers by reducing information asymmetries
between them and their insurers. This would limit adverse selection, a highly
theorized problem in insurance markets, which occurs when high-risk insureds
purchase more insurance than low-risk insureds, potentially causing premiums
to spiral upward as "good" risks forego insurance altogether. Given this and
other potential benefits of contingent commissions, commentators have argued
that insurance purchasers, so long as they are informed, should be allowed to
choose brokers and agents who accept contingent commissions.23 According to
these writers, not only would meaningful disclosure empower insureds over
regulators, but it also would prompt more careful scrutiny of intermediaries'
actions, thereby limiting the likelihood that insureds would be steered toward
suboptimal insurance.
This Article questions the emerging consensus among state officials and
academics that disclosure is a sufficient solution to the problems that
contingent commissions pose. Both the substance and the strength of this
challenge depend upon the sophistication and knowledge of insurance
purchasers. For this reason, this Article first analyzes consumer insurance
markets-such as homeowners, renters, and automobile insurance-where
purchasers tend to be relatively unfamiliar with many elements of the insurance
industry. It then proceeds to commercial insurance markets, such as directors'
and officers' (D&O) insurance and business automobile insurance, where
purchasers are assumed to be knowledgeable and rational about their insurance
options.
The Article concludes that a disclosure requirement in consumer insurance
21. In a speech to the National Press Club, Spitzer stated that the use of contingent commissions
"may be appropriate" in certain segments of the insurance industry when they are disclosed to
consumers. Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Ins. Agents, PIA National Encouraged by Remarks
Made by N.Y. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer on Contingent Commissions (Jan. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.pianet.com/NewsCenter/PressReleases/1-31-05.htm.
22. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 386-89; Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3060-61; see
also Gary Biglaiser, Middlemen as Experts, 24 RAND J. ECON. 212 (1993) (showing that middlemen can
help reduce adverse selection in a variety of markets, but not discussing the role of a contingent
commission payment structure in this process).
23. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3066-71; see also Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 394
(suggesting that contingent commissions should not be banned because they can be beneficial to clients);
Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann, Insuring the Uninsurable: Brokers and Incomplete Insurance
Contracts 18 (Ctr. for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 24, 2005), available at http://www.ifk-
cfs.de/papers/05.24.pdf.
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markets is unlikely to address meaningfully the core risk of contingent
24commissions-the potential for inefficient steering. In fact, contingent
commissions are merely one example of a common type of regulatory problem,
termed a "trilateral dilemma" by Professor Howell Jackson, which lawmakers
consistently regulate in ways that go beyond mere disclosure. 25 In a generic
trilateral dilemma, market intermediaries extract side payments from other
professionals for steering business to them. 26 For instance, a real estate agent
may recommend a particular lawyer to his customers in exchange for kickbacks
from the lawyer. 27 Trilateral dilemmas tend to be immune to disclosure-based
remedies for three basic reasons, each of which squarely applies to contingent
commissions. First, consumers who rely on intermediaries to recommend other
service providers generally have an inherently limited capacity to assess the
end-service provider's relative strengths and weaknesses. Second, because
intermediaries interact closely with their customers, they can discriminate
between sophisticated and unsophisticated customers, taking advantage of the
latter by giving them biased advice while providing more objective advice to
the former. Finally, customers often have a relationship of trust with their
intermediary that blunts any tendency to scrutinize the advice they receive. Just
as each of these considerations has generally supported robust government
regulation of most trilateral dilemmas, they also support affirmative
government intervention in the case of contingent commissions.
Not only are the risks of contingent commissions large in consumer
insurance markets, but the benefits of these payments are minimal at best. The
core benefit of reduced adverse selection that commentators have offered in
support of contingent commissions is both significantly overstated and highly
speculative in consumer insurance markets. Extensive empirical research has
consistently shown that adverse selection is not a significant problem in these
28insurance markets. Moreover, there is little empirical evidence that contingent
commissions really do improve insurers' information about potential insureds,
and significant theoretical reasons to believe that they do not. Weighing these
costs and benefits of contingent commissions, the Article suggests that the
optimal regulatory solution may be to ban contingent commission arrangements
in consumer insurance markets.
A disclosure-based response to contingent commissions in commercial
insurance markets, where purchasers tend to be sophisticated about insurance
24. See infra Section LI.A.
25. Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield
Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. (forthcoming 2007); see also Howell Jackson, The
Trilateral Dilemma (July 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
26. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra 25.
27. See id.
28. See infra Section lI.B. See generally Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets:
An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
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options, is more likely to be effective than in consumer insurance markets. But
this Article demonstrates that even when insurance purchasers are both
informed and rational, there are still reasons to be concerned about a
disclosure-based response. First, disclosure of contingent commissions may
result in rational and informed insurance purchasers seeking out intermediaries
who accept contingent commissions even though they would prefer such
commissions to be banned due to the risk of steering. The reason for this
divergence between market behavior and individual purchaser preferences is
that those who purchase insurance through an intermediary that does not
receive contingent commissions may signal to insurers that they view
themselves to be high-risk. If so, then insurers will charge an increased
premium for consumers who purchase insurance in this way, undermining the
extent to which consumers' informed market choices reflect their actual
preferences regarding contingent commissions. Second, the adverse selection
defense of contingent commissions is also questionable in commercial
insurance markets. Contingent commissions may erode the relationship of trust
between independent intermediaries and their clients and consequently shift,
rather than eliminate, the information asymmetry that results in adverse
selection.
Part I of this Article reviews the arguments in the extant literature about the
costs and benefits of contingent commissions. It shows that the key concern
with respect to contingent commissions is the risk associated with inefficient
steering. It also explains how contingent commissions may improve insurance
markets by reducing adverse selection. Part II applies the framework developed
in Part I to consumer insurance markets. It argues that the limitations of
disclosure in solving trilateral dilemmas create a significant risk that insurance
intermediaries will continue to steer their customers toward inefficient
arrangements in the absence of more robust regulation. It also argues that the
risks associated with adverse selection in consumer property-casualty insurance
markets are small, and that they are not appreciably reduced by contingent
commission payments. For these reasons, Part II concludes that lawmakers
should consider banning contingent commission payments in consumer
insurance markets. Part III applies the framework developed in Part I to
commercial insurance markets. It develops a theoretical model that shows that
even fully informed insurance purchasers may not make decisions about their
insurance intermediaries that reflect their actual preferences regarding
contingent commissions. It also shows that the capacity of contingent
commissions to reduce adverse selection is limited because of their potential to
induce strategic, inefficient behavior by rational high-risk insureds. Part III
concludes that disclosure in commercial insurance markets, like disclosure in
consumer markets, may be an insufficient regulatory solution, but that
empirical work is needed before a policy prescription can be endorsed.
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I. THE CONTINGENT COMMISSION DEBATE: INCREASED STEERING VS.
REDUCED ADVERSE SELECTION
The current debate about contingent commissions focuses on their impact
on the incentives of independent intermediaries. These payments shift such
incentives to be less aligned with those of insurance consumers and more
aligned with those of insurers. As a result, independent intermediaries that
receive contingent commissions may tend to act in ways that initially appear
less favorable for the consumer and more favorable for the insurer.
This Part reviews, but does not critique, the two key ways in which the
literature has suggested this may occur. Section A describes the argument that
contingent commissions cause intermediaries to steer their customers to
suboptimal insurance arrangements. Section B then reviews the primary
defense of contingent commission payments: that they create an incentive for
intermediaries to share relevant customer information with insurers in a way
that limits adverse selection. Section C considers some alternative defenses of
contingent commissions, but concludes that they are generally unpersuasive.
This Part therefore seeks to frame the basic contingent commission debate as
involving two competing claims: that contingent commissions increase
steering, and that they decrease adverse selection. The remainder of the Article
builds off of this framework.
A. Contingent Commissions and Inefficient Steering
Independent insurance intermediaries help facilitate efficient purchases by
matching customers with insurance options that fit their needs and preferences.
Insurers vary substantially based on their reputations for claims handling,
29
financial strength,30 and risk management services. 3 1 Even the scope of
coverage that an insurer provides-in both its base policies and its
endorsements-can vary.32 The role of independent intermediaries is to help
their customers understand these variations in quality and assess what policy
29. See Consumer Reports Investigates: Surviving the 'Hard Market' in Homeowners Insurance,
CONSUMER REP., Sept. 2004, at 36 (describing how homeowner insurers differ significantly with regard
to the percentage of customers reporting problems with claims or delayed payment); Homeowners
Insurance: Report, CONSUMER REP., Jan. 1999, at 16 (suggesting that consumers, when choosing an
insurer, consider customer satisfaction with claims handling among other factors).
30. See generally A.M. Best, Guide to Best's Financial Strength Ratings (Jan. 2, 2007),
http://www.ambest.com/ratings/guide.asp.
31. Some homeowners insurance companies, for instance, provide their insureds with free washing
machine hoses in order to limit the risk of flooding. See Meg Green, Top of Their Game, BEST'S REV.,
Dec. 2006, at 32.
32. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance
Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1417-18 (2007) (noting that large insurers can deviate from
ISO standard form contracts because they can generate sufficient actuarial data from their own pool of
insureds).
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type is best for their needs. 33 Additionally, independent intermediaries can help
their customers identify pricing differentials among insurers that are not
attributable to differences in quality. This is not uncommon even in price-
competitive insurance markets: insurers often differ in the focus of their
underwriting, meaning that they are willing to offer certain types of
individuals-for instance, those who do not drink any alcohol-lower rates
than other insurers.34 Independent intermediaries can help match their
customers with the insurer that employs underwriting criteria most favorable
for the customer.
Contingent commissions may cause ostensibly independent intermediaries
to deviate from this market-matching role and to steer insureds to suboptimal
insurance arrangements. 35 To understand why, consider the basic structure of
contingent commissions. These payments are bonuses, which insurers pay to
intermediaries in addition to ordinary premium commissions. While premium
commissions are stable-a simple percentage of an insured's total premium-
contingent commission arrangements vary considerably. 36 In general, the size
of an intermediary's contingent commission is based on two variables: (1) the
amount of insurance business that a particular intermediary refers to the insurer,
as measured in total premiums; and (2) the profitability of that business, which
is usually measured by the insurer's loss ratio.37 In most cases, intermediaries
are only entitled to contingent commissions if they meet threshold levels of
both sales volume and profitability. 38 Once intermediaries reach these
qualifying levels, their commissions typically increase with better results along
either dimension.
39
This payment structure is likely to alter the ways in which independent
intermediaries direct their customers to insurers. Most obviously, independent
intermediaries may steer their clients to insurers that pay contingent
33. See ABRAHAM, supra note 13, at 56-66; see also Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 360.
34. See generally Green, supra note 31, at 26 (describing how some of the most profitable
property-casualty insurers focus on underwriting only particularly safe risks, and pass off some of the
resulting cost savings to their insureds).
35. See HUNTER, supra note 11, at 2-8; Press Release, supra note 1.
36. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 374-75.
37. See Jeffrey Wilder, Competing for the Effort of a Common Agent: Contingency Fees in
Commercial Insurance 5 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Group Working Paper
No. EAG03-4, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=418061. The loss ratio is the "ratio between
premiums paid and losses incurred during a given period." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (7th ed.
1999). Premiums on both new policies and policy renewals are generally treated similarly in these
calculations, which are almost always made on a yearly basis. Wilder, supra, at 5.
38. See Wilder, supra note 37, at 5. In some cases, contingent commission arrangements may be
based only on profitability, not volume. However, according to Cummins and Doherty, "the great
majority of the arrangements covering the smaller intermediaries is based on the profitability of the
business written or profitability and volume." Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 379. Marsh and
McLennan's contingent commission arrangements were distinctive in this regard, paying Marsh solely
based on the volume of premiums that it brought to a given insurer. See id. at 16 n.20.
39. See Wilder, supra note 37, at 5.
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commissions over those that do not: intermediaries will generally earn more in
contingent commissions when their customers buy insurance through an insurer
with whom the intermediary has a contingent commission contract.
40
Contingent commissions may also induce intermediaries to steer their
customers to certain insurers in a number of less obvious situations. For
instance, even when an independent intermediary can earn contingent
commissions from multiple different insurers, the intermediary may maximize
its profits by steering its customers to an insurer that offers the most lucrative
commission. Alternatively, an intermediary might profit by steering a customer
to an insurer whose contingent commission contract has a minimum-volume
requirement on the cusp of being satisfied, even though a different insurer was
the best match for that particular consumer. Yet another possibility is that an
intermediary might profit by steering relatively high-risk insureds to insurers
who do not offer contingent commissions, so as to maintain a good "loss ratio"
with the insurers who do offer contingent commissions.
42
To illustrate these dynamics more concretely, consider an insurance agent
who has contingent commission arrangements with two insurers, X and Y. The
arrangement with insurer X provides that the agent is entitled to an additional
1% of the insured's premium if the agent's book of business-the customers
the agent successfully refers to the insurer-reaches $1 million of premiums for
the year and generates $100,000 of profit. The arrangement with Y is identical,
except that it entitles the intermediary to an additional 2% of the insured's
premium if the triggering conditions are met. Initially the agent will have an
incentive to steer customers to both X and Y, rather than to other insurers, so
that he can meet the million-dollar premium requirement for both insurers. If he
reaches this plateau with Y but not before year's end, he may then start
40. One exception, noted below, is that an intermediary may actually maximize contingent
commissions by steering an insured who is high-risk to an insurer with whom the intermediary does not
have a contingent commission arrangement.
41. See Wilder, supra note 37, at 19. Another potential risk for consumers is that contingent
commissions may cause independent intermediaries to be insufficiently aggressive in seeking payment
for their client's insurance claim. See HUNTER, supra note 11, at 7-8. Generally independent
intermediaries not only help their customers select appropriate coverage but also manage the ongoing
relationship between the customer and insurer, transmitting premium payments and negotiating claims.
See generally ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 35 (1987) (describing the role
of intermediaries in facilitating the purchase of insurance). Because contingent commissions reward
independent intermediaries based on the insurer's profitability, they create a disincentive for
intermediaries to maximize the claims payment their clients receive: the less the client receives, the
more profitable the intermediaries' book of business is with the insurer, and thus the more the
intermediary stands to gain in contingent commissions. The danger of this effect is unclear, however, as
insurance consumers are likely to be quite sensitive to their intermediaries' capacity to successfully
negotiate claims; payment on claims is likely to be almost as salient a consideration for most consumers
as policy price. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3062 ("Anyone with practical experiences in the
insurance business knows that customers make lasting judgments about intermediaries and insurers
based on their behavior in the claims-paying context .... ").
42. This last scenario may be an example of efficient steering. For elaboration, see infra text
accompanying notes 68-71.
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referring more customers to X. Once the agent is comfortable that he will meet
the premium requirements for both X and Y, he may then start referring lower-
risk customers to Y in order to maximize Y's profits, and thus to increase the
likelihood of hitting the profit target that is linked to the payment of the
contingent commissions.
This steering is potentially problematic because the insurers that pay
contingent commissions to an intermediary may not best suit a particular
insured's risk preferences and needs. At the very least, these insurers will tend
to charge more than other insurers in order to support the costs of paying
contingent commissions. A recent study found that insurers pass through the
entire cost of contingent commissions to their insureds.4 3 The study controlled
for insurers' size, financial leverage, mix of business by line, and
44
diversification across lines of business. In other words, while insurers pay
contingent commissions to intermediaries, consumers ultimately bear the cost
of these payments in the form of increased premiums. 45 Insurers that pay
contingent commissions may be suboptimal for reasons other than price,
however. These insurers may provide coverage that deviates from a customer's
preferences with regard to claims handling, financial strength, risk management
services, or coverage scope. Although there is no empirical evidence that
insurers paying contingent commissions are systematically worse than other
insurers along these quality dimensions, there are certain to be instances in
which the best insurance choice for the consumer will not align with the
insurance option that pays his or her intermediary the most in contingent
commissions. To the extent that independent intermediaries prioritize their
receipt of contingent commissions over their market-matching role, then
customers will often receive insurance of a quality and price that is not best for
their needs.
Of course, sales personnel in a variety of other industries likely face similar
incentives to promote specific product types. Although lawmakers do not
typically worry about these conflicts of interest, contingent commissions are
distinctive for two important reasons. First, unlike a car salesman or a store
43. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 383. Insurers also pass through the full costs of
premium commissions to their insureds. Id. These estimates were derived using data that exploited the
fact that different insurers offer different levels of contingent commissions. Id. at 380-83. It is therefore
not inconsistent with the argument presented later, see infra notes 168-170 and accompanying text, that
insurers may adopt a strategy of charging more to insurance consumers who purchase from
intermediaries that completely disclaim contingent commissions.
44. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 380-83.
45. As the authors of the study rightly note, the mere fact that insurers who pay contingent
commissions also tend to charge more for their insurance does not necessarily mean that these insurers
are worse for the consumer. If the increased costs attributable to contingent commission payments create
benefits for the consumer in the form of reduced adverse selection, see infra Section I.B., and these
benefits outweigh the price increase as well as the other potential costs of contingent commissions, then
consumers are better off purchasing insurance from these intermediaries, see Cummins & Doherty,
supra note 2, at 381-83.
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clerk, independent intermediaries actively advertise their independence.46 The
website of the Independent Agents and Brokers of America encourages
consumers to purchase insurance through an independent intermediary rather
than through a captive agent or direct underwriter because independent agents
are not beholden to any one company.47 Rather, the website claims that they are
"value hunter[s] who look[] after your pocketbook in finding the best
combination of price, coverage and service" because "serving you is your
independent agent's most important concern." 48  Similarly, prospective
customers are given brochures explaining that their independent agent "shop[s]
among various companies" to "find the best combination of coverage, price and
service-the best value for your insurance dollar."49 These brochures describe
the agent as someone "who... goes to bat for you when you need help or
advice" and who "is your Personal Insurance Adviser-someone you can count
on and trust., 50 Each of these claims of independence is confirmed by the
simple, but important, fact that independent agents have their own storefronts
or office buildings, which advertise the independent agent's company name,
not the names of insurers. This professed independence is one of the primary
reasons that insureds choose to purchase their insurance through independent
intermediaries. 5 1 By contrast, consumers understand that sales agents often
have an incentive to steer their customers to particular (usually more
expensive) products, and discount the advice they receive accordingly.
Second, ordinary consumers typically have little capacity to compare
insurance products on their own without the benefits of independent advice
from intermediaries. 52 Insurance is a complicated and intangible product with
46. See HUNTER, supra note 13, at 3; infra notes 138-140 and accompanying text; see also Money
on the Table, LEADER'S EDGE, Jan.-Feb. 2007, available at http://www.ciab.com/
Content/ContentGroups/LeadersEdgeMagazine2/2007/JanFeb3/MoneyontheTable.htm ("The
distinction between an agent and broker has been lost because most agents present themselves as
representing the interests of the insured." (quoting Bobby Reagan, Reagan Consulting)).
47. See Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers of Am., Inc., http://www.iiaa.org/ (follow "Consumer
Information" hyperlink; then follow "Choosing an Independent Agent" hyperlink) (last visited April 11,
2007).
48. See id.; see also Hunter, supra note 11, at 3. Such language is also common in insurance
brokers' materials. Indeed, Marsh & McClellan's website proclaimed that "[o]ur guiding principle is to
consider our client's best interest in all placements" and added: "We are our clients' advocates, and we
represent them in negotiations. We don't represent the [insurance companies]." See Marsh Complaint,
supra note 10, 6.
49. NAT'L ASS'N OF PROF'L INS. AGENTS, STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT CHOOSING A PROFESSIONAL
INSURANCE AGENT (1997), available at http://www.pianet.com/Publications/
choosinganagentbrochure.ht.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., The Motley Fool, Insurance Center: Basics, http://www.fool.com/insurancecenter/
basics/basics07.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2007) ("An independent insurance agent represents a number
of insurance companies and can more objectively weigh pluses and minuses across many companies and
types of insurance.").
52. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1412-22 (discussing the avenues by which insurance
consumers learn about different insurance options and the limitations of these sources of information).
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which most consumers have very little experience or knowledge. 53 Moreover,
insurers' reputations imperfectly reflect the underlying quality of their products
and services. 54 In markets with such limited consumer information, truly
independent intermediaries are crucial for market outcomes to be efficient.55
Independent advice is significantly less important in markets where products
have relatively well-understood features and accurate reputations.
56
Defenders of contingent commissions admit that the practice theoretically
creates conflicts of interest for independent intermediaries, but they argue that
competition will minimize the negative impact of these conflicts, especially
when supplemented with disclosure. For most independent producers,
contingent commissions constitute only a small fraction of their overall
revenue, with estimates ranging between 4% and 6% on average. 57 The vast
majority of most intermediaries' compensation instead derives from ordinary
58premium commissions. As such, defenders of contingent commissions reason
that the primary goal for independent intermediaries is to sell insurance and
generate premium-based commissions. Doing so, of course, critically depends
on attracting and retaining customers. According to these commentators, were
brokers and independent agents systematically to steer their customers to over-
priced, low-quality coverage, their loss in premium revenues would far exceed
53. See Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 968 (1970); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323,
339 (1986) ("[l]nsurance is an intangible product that is not particularly well understood by the average
consumer.").
54. See Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1413-15 (arguing that insurers' reputations do not perfectly
reflect the overall quality of their products because, while reputation is largely a function of friends' and
families' experience, few insurance consumers receive the most important features of their insurance-
protection against low-probability, high-cost losses).
55. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 32[b] (2d ed. 1996) ("In
forming a contract, an insured relies not upon the text of the policies but on the general descriptions of
the coverage provided by the insurer and its agents during the time the insured is considering submitting
an application."); Biglaiser, supra note 22, at 221 (describing how intermediaries can help facilitate
efficient purchasers in markets where information is imperfect); W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 547 (1971) (noting
that the average consumer "depends on an insurance agent and insurance company to sell him a policy
that 'works' for its intended purpose in much the same way that he depends on a television salesman and
television manufacturer").
56. See Biglaiser, supra note 22, at 221.
57. One survey found that, on average, contingent commissions account for only 6% of the
revenues received by independent agents. Anne Gron, Compensation and Industry Profitability:
Evidence from the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 71 J. BUS. 407, 410 (1998) (citing INDEP. INS.
AGENTS OF AM., AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY'S GUIDE TO PROFIT-SHARING/INCENTIVE COMPENSATION
AGREEMENTS (1988)). Other surveys have found similar, though slightly lower, figures for insurance
brokers. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 375 n.16 (citing CONNING & CO., COMMERCIAL
INSURANCE BROKERS: THEY SNOOZE, THEY LOSE (1999) (finding in a survey of brokers that contingent
commissions accounted on average for 5% of brokers' revenues in 1994 and 4.6% in 1999)). For both
brokers and independent agents, the percentage of revenue attributable to contingent commissions varies
widely. One survey, for instance, found that some brokers received almost 12% of their revenue from
contingent commissions, while others received only 1% of their revenue from such commissions. See id.
at 365 tbl.2.
58. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 375; Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3056.
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whatever minimal gain they could receive in contingent commissions. 59 This is
especially true given the competitiveness of most property-casualty insurance
markets. Disclosure of contingent commissions, while not strictly necessary
for this competitive process, can help facilitate it. Such disclosure encourages
insurance consumers to monitor the quality of their intermediaries' advice or,
alternatively, to insist on intermediaries who do not accept contingent
commissions.
It is for similar reasons, these commentators have suggested, that few
officials or regulators worry about whether ordinary, premium-based
commissions will cause intermediaries to steer their customers to particularly
expensive insurance. Although intermediaries could theoretically increase their
premium-based commissions through steering in the short run, market forces
deter this result in the long run.6 1 The same logic applies, according to these
writers, to contingent commissions. To the extent that insurance costs more
when the insurer pays contingent commissions, the best explanation is that this
59. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 385 (arguing against the notion that intermediaries
receiving contingent commissions will steer customers because "contingent commissions account for
only about 5 percent of revenue," and "[i]ntermediaries who make inferior placements in pursuit of
higher contingent commissions are balancing a small gain against the possibility of a much larger loss,
i.e., the loss of the premium-based commission if the client becomes dissatisfied and switches to a
competitor"); Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3061-62 (noting that concern that intermediaries will steer
consumers to suboptimal insurers is not "utterly unfounded," but dismissing it because "insurance
intermediaries are normally more concerned with the risk of losing a good customer to a competing
producer than they are with any marginal inducements that may be provided by any one insurance
carrier").
60. For a response to this argument, see infra Section ILA, which argues that competitive forces are
unlikely to negate the costs of contingent commissions. This does not mean that the industry as a whole
is not competitive on price. See J. DAVID CUMMINS, DEREGULATING PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE
2-3 (2002) (explaining that deregulation of property-casualty insurance could benefit consumers because
"the insurance industry is competitive"); Paul Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the
Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 375, 391 ("The property-liability
insurance industry possesses the structural characteristics normally associated with the idealized
competitive market: a large number of firms, operating in a market with low concentration levels, selling
essentially identical products, provided at constant unit costs and with ease of entry of new and potential
competitors."). For an argument that the industry is not competitive with regard to policy drafting, see
Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1401-26.
61. There are at least three important distinctions between the conflicts of interest generated by
premium-based commissions and those generated by contingent commissions. First, premium-based
commissions create a very simple type of conflict: they mean that producers earn more when their
customers pay more. By contrast, because contingent commissions are linked to insurers' profits, they
create a complicated array of conflicts that can impact advice about insurance quality as well as price.
Insurers' profits can increase either if the price of the insurance is too high or if the cost of the insurance
is too low. Market forces will generally be better at limiting large price differentials in insurance than at
addressing biased advice about quality or the necessity of different insurance options. See infra text
accompanying notes 114-128. Second, premium-based commissions are much easier to disclose
effectively to insurance consumers than are contingent commissions because the former operate only on
individual transactions. In contrast to contingent commissions, whose impact on an independent
intermediary can only be assessed when looking at aggregate, year-end data, individuals can
immediately deduce the relevance of differential premium-based commissions. See infra note 119
(explaining that this difficulty in disclosing contingent commissions potentially can be overcome by the
use of retrospective supplemental compensation arrangements). Third, premium-based commissions are
generally standard across the industry within a given insurance line. See infra note 164.
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extra cost is warranted by the benefits that contingent commissions create for
the consumer.
62
B. Contingent Commissions and Adverse Selection
The core defense of contingent commissions rests on the observation that
these payments align the interests of independent intermediaries and insurers:
both are better off when the insurer makes a profit on the intermediary's book
of business. As two insurance economists, J. David Cummins and Neil A.
Doherty, have recently argued in an influential paper,63 this commonality of
interests potentially alters intermediaries' behavior in a significant way: it
encourages intermediaries to help insurers charge their customers an actuarially
appropriate premium. If insurers charge an intermediary's customer a premium
that is too low, then the intermediary's loss ratio for that insurer will suffer,
reducing the expected amount of the intermediary's contingent commission. If,
on the other hand, the insurer misjudges the customer's risk level in the other
direction and charges a premium that is too high, the customer may purchase
insurance through a different insurer or decide to forego purchasing insurance
altogether. The expected value of the intermediary's contingent commissions
will decrease in this situation as well.
According to Cummins and Doherty, independent intermediaries that
receive contingent commissions can theoretically help insurers set appropriate
premiums by informing them about a potential insured's risk profile.
64
Independent brokers and agents interact directly with potential insureds and
often have longstanding relationships with these clients. These intermediaries
may therefore possess information about potential insureds that would
62. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 394.
63. The study was funded by the American Insurance Association. See id. at 359 (acknowledging
funding from the Association). On the influence of this argument, see, for example, Fitzpatrick, supra
note 3, at 3060-61; and Andrea Ortega-Wells, Wharton Study Finds Agents, Brokers Play Critical Role
in Buying Process, INS. J., June 8, 2005, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2005/06/08/55791 .htm.
64. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 386-89; see also Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson,
Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance Marketing System, 39 J.L. & ECON. 637, 639 (1996)
("The agent is the first contact the insurer has with a potential policyholder and may be able to obtain
information about the customer which would be difficult or costly for the firm to verify."). There is
significant evidence that "captive" insurance agents, who work only for one insurer and therefore do not
receive contingent commissions, do indeed perform this information-gathering role. For instance, one
training manual for an insurer's captive agents instructs them to treat all potential insureds as "suspects"
and to "[b]e proactive and selective in your prospecting activity" and "ruthless in getting rid of' bad
risks. RICHARD V. ERICKSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 226 (2003). Another insurance
company manual insists that agents consider "the desirability of the client's entire account," and another
reminds agents that it is through their "application of ability, knowledge, experience and courage that
risks can be selected properly and produce a profit for the insurer." Id. at 228. A major work in the
sociology of insurance thus finds that agents are "instructed that the selection and rating process is shot
through with discretion." Id. at 239.
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otherwise be unavailable to insurance companies. 65 In some cases, this
information may consist of concrete facts about the insured that are not
captured in the ordinary insurance application process. For instance, an
intermediary may know that a potential insured was nearly sued earlier in the
year, but that the potential plaintiff unexpectedly dropped the suit for personal
reasons. Perhaps more frequently, though, an intermediary's informational
advantage may consist of subjective impressions about an insurance
consumer's risk level that are impossible for the insurer to discern through
application forms. 6 6 The intermediary may observe, for instance, that a small
business owner tends to miss scheduled appointments or looks disheveled and
disorganized. Without contingent commissions, Cummins and Doherty suggest,
there would be "no incentive for the agent to reveal the information about
policyholder risk types" to the insurer unless the insurer engaged in costly
monitoring of its agents.
67
Contingent commissions may improve insurer information even if
intermediaries and insurers do not explicitly communicate with one another. As
described above, contingent commissions may cause intermediaries to steer
relatively high-risk insureds to insurers that do not offer contingent
commissions, so as to maintain a good "loss ratio" with those insurers that do.
68
The better an intermediary's loss ratio is, the more he or she will receive in
contingent commissions. 69 Consequently, contingent commissions may allow
insurers to know that they are receiving relatively low-risk insureds from their
intermediaries irrespective of their direct communications with these
intermediaries. 70 In this way, contingent commissions may actually create
efficient, rather than problematic, steering.
71
65. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 386.
66. See Regan & Tennyson, supra note 64, at 639 ("It is widely acknowledged that agents often
employ subjective criteria in evaluating insurance applicants."). Agents selling homeowners insurance,
for instance, have been told to identify whether potential insureds live near a "'hangout' for a local
youth gang," whether they keep their home clean, or whether a household pet appeared "unusual or
vicious." ERICKSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 230, 232. As the manual explained, "[p]oorly kept or
poorly maintained premises may indicate a lack of responsibility on the potential client's part," and
"[o]bvious damage to furniture, carpets, and other personal property can also indicate a moral or liability
hazard." Id. at 230. One insurance agent operator explained that sometimes he rejected an insurance
applicant after meeting with him because he "had a 'gut feeling' that the person was simply 'bad luck."'
Id. at 247. Insurers often grant a similar level of discretion to their agents when it comes to automobile
insurance, with one auto insurance manual explaining that "[a]gents working in the field are in the best
position to know or observe any undesirable characteristics of the clients as operators of the vehicle." Id.
at 264.
67. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 389. It is modest support for this argument that some
insurers offer differential commissions to their captive agents based on the loss ratio of that agent's book
of business. See ERICKSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 246. The explicit purpose of this scheme is to
improve the agent's selections of risks. See id. at 246-47.
68. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
70. For a critical response to this argument, see infra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.
71. Seesupra note 42.
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To the extent that contingent commissions do indeed improve the
information that intermediaries transmit to insurers, the increase in efficiency is
potentially significant. Decreasing information asymmetries between insurers
and insureds is particularly valuable in insurance markets because of the
72possibility that such asymmetries result in adverse selection. Adverse
selection "is commonly described as the tendency of persons with relatively
greater exposure to risk to seek [more] insurance protection." 73 It can occur
when insurance consumers have information about their potential risk that
insurers cannot observe, making it difficult for insurers to offer insurance to
low-risk individuals at an actuarially fair price. This potentially results in a self-
reinforcing trend: low-risk insureds tend to forego insurance because it is too
expensive for them, resulting in mostly high-risk insureds purchasing
insurance, resulting in a further price increase.74
C. Other Potential Benefits of Contingent Commissions
Any productive assessment of contingent commissions must compare the
risk that the practice biases intermediaries' advice against the prospect that it
improves insurer information and thus limits adverse selection.75 To date, most
of the other arguments concerning contingent commissions that commentators
72. See George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1541 (1987) ("Adverse selection is a problem central to every insurance context, and it dominates the
insurance function."). The seminal article describing adverse selection in the insurance market is
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, 90 Q.J. ECON.
629 (1976).
73. Priest, supra note 72, at 1541. Priest explains the adverse selection problem as follows:
An insurer must collect into a risk pool individuals with a sufficiently narrow range of
exposure to risk for the insurance to remain financially attractive to each member of the pool.
The insurance premium for the pool must be set according to the average level of risk brought
to the pool. The wider the range between high-risk and low-risk pool members, the greater the
difference between the average risk and the risk of low-risk members. Low-risk members pay
a premium that, because it is based on an average which includes high-risk members, is more
than they would have to pay if they could be segregated into a risk pool of their own. If the
disparity between the premium and the risks added by low-risk members becomes too
substantial, low-risk members may drop out of the pool because they find alternative means of
protection cheaper than market insurance.
Id.
74. A secondary benefit of facilitating credible communication between independent intermediaries
and insurers, which Cummins and Doherty do not discuss, is that doing so may improve the efficiency
of the insurance investigation process. Insurance intermediaries can more efficiently inquire about a
client's risks than an insurer because intermediaries need only do so once in order to transmit those
conclusions to multiple different insurers. Regan & Tennyson, supra note 64, at 639. By contrast, if the
entire process of vetting the risks associated with potential insureds were left to each insurer, then
multiple insurers would need to conduct repetitive inquiries whenever an insured was turned down for
coverage by the first insurer. If contingent commissions facilitate intermediaries' willingness and ability
to transmit accurate information to insurers, then it may shift parts of the investigative process from
insurers to intermediaries and thus reduce the number of duplicative inquiries that need to be made. See
id.
75. One additional relevant consideration, introduced infra Section Ill.B, is that contingent
commissions may induce strategic, socially inefficient behavior by high-risk, sophisticated insureds.
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and advocates have advanced are largely unconvincing and serve to muddy the
key analytical issues. This Section reviews these issues and explains why they
ought not to factor significantly in the ultimate policy analysis.
1. Contingent Commissions as a Method of Expanding Insurance
Coverage
In a recent paper, two leading insurance economists argued that contingent
commissions may be desirable because they can help expand the insurance
market to cover theoretically insurable losses that are not identified in the
governing policy.76 In a number of circumstances, insurers can efficiently cover
insureds' losses even though the applicable policy does not provide such
coverage. 77 Despite the exclusion of these losses from policy terms, the paper
suggests that independent intermediaries may be able to induce insurers to pay
such nonverifiable losses ex post when doing so is efficient: not only do
independent intermediaries have the expertise to decide when insurance can
efficiently be provided for nonverifiable losses, but they have the power to
remove their customers from an insurer that fails to pay for such losses.7 8 But
intermediaries, according to the argument, will only have a strong incentive to
police coverage for nonverifiable losses to the extent that they receive some
slice of the value that is generated by extending insurance in this way.
79
Contingent commissions, the article concludes, can serve this role because the
intermediary receives commissions in proportion to the insurer's profitability,
which includes the additional rent the insurer charges for covering
nonverifiable losses.
80
This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it is unlikely that
contingent commissions actually enhance independent intermediaries'
willingness to punish insurers who do not provide coverage for nonverifiable
76. Doherty & Muermann, supra note 23.
77. See id. at 3-4; Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1401-26 (arguing that insurance policies may fail to
provide efficient coverage due to various market failures in the drafting of insurance policies). Such
events may not have been anticipated, may have been too complicated to include in the contract, or may
have been excluded from the contract due to market imperfections. See Doherty & Muermann, supra
note 23, at 3-4.
78. See Doherty & Muermann, supra note 23, at 6-8. Interestingly, this theory is consistent with a
recent article in which Jason Scott Johnston has argued that, in a variety of contexts, standard form
contracts facilitate ex post bargaining between consumers and company employees who have the
authority to grant exceptions from the terms of these contracts. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of
Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation
Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REv. 857 (2006). Of course, Doherty and
Muermann's claim is not simply that insurers grant exceptions from insurance policy terms ex post, but
that independent insurance agents and brokers facilitate that role. It is this latter claim that is rejected
above.
79. Doherty & Muermann, supra note 23, at 9 ("In our model, brokers seek future efficiency gains
because they can capture rents directly from value added.").
80. See id. at 8-9.
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losses ex post. The fact that intermediaries receive contingent commissions
actually creates an incentive for them not to punish insurers who do not cover
nonverifiable losses ex post: insurers profit more from this result, meaning that
the contingent commissions that intermediaries receive are larger.
81
Admittedly, contingent commissions may encourage intermediaries to claim, ex
ante, that they will police nonverifiable losses. But they-just like insurers-
will invariably face the opposite incentive ex post. In the end, the only reason
that the article concludes otherwise is that it assumes that insureds are fully
aware of intermediaries' reputations for negotiating coverage for nonverifiable
losses ex post.82 Yet this assumption about insurance intermediaries is no more
plausible than the assumption that insureds can directly observe insurance
companies' reputations for ex post settlement of nonverifiable claims. The
authors specifically reject this "informational assumption" as too "strong." 83 In
truth, though, insureds are likely to be better able to observe insurers'
tendencies to pay nonverifiable claims ex post than to observe intermediaries'
tendency to advocate for this result.84 The latter cannot easily be inferred from
claims histories, and significantly more information is available about insurers'
reputations than intermediaries' reputations: there are fewer insurers than
intermediaries, and information about insurers' payment practices and service
levels are readily available from consumer magazines and websites.
85
A second limitation of this argument is that it is unclear why contingent
commissions are any better at inducing intermediaries to facilitate the coverage
of nonverifiable losses than ordinary premium-based commissions. If insurance
premiums are higher because insurance coverage has been expanded to include
coverage for nonverifiable losses, then intermediaries will be compensated
through higher premium-based commissions. Contingent commissions, then,
are not necessary for the underlying argument about nonverifiable coverage to
work.
81. Seesupranote4l.
82. See Doherty & Muermann, supra note 23, at 14 (stating the assumption that "[e]ach
policyholder observes [the broker's] settlement of a non-verifiable claim, or the broker's penalty on the
insurer if it is not paid").
83. Id. at 13 (arguing that while brokers are not "strictly necessary to create a market for non-
verifiable losses," the "informational assumptions are strong" because "all policyholders must observe
all of the incumbent insurers [sic] claim payments to all policyholders and be prepared to switch if even
one policyholder is denied").
84. The fact that insurance purchasers can evaluate the reputations of insurers better than the
reputations of intermediaries does not mean that, in absolute terms, insurance consumers are generally
informed about insurers' reputations. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
85. See Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1419 (describing how insurance consumers rely on secondary
material to learn about their insurance options); see also supra note 29 (citing Consumer Reports articles
discussing insurers' reputations for claims handling).
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2. Contingent Commissions as a Protector of Small Agencies
Another argument advanced in favor of contingent commissions is that they
are necessary to prevent the "bankrupt[cy] [of] hundreds of small insurance
agencies in communities throughout America" and the consequent "further
consolidation of insurance brokerage business in large global firms."8 6 The
logic of this argument is that contingent commissions function as "house
money" that is necessary for insurance agencies to pay for their basic overhead
expenses. 87 According to this argument, without contingent commissions, a
disproportionate amount of money would be retained by employee-agents of
small agencies. The reason is that employee-agents have disproportionate
bargaining power over the agencies that employ them: employee-agents can
easily move to competing agencies because they own their "book of business,"
allowing them to take their existing clients with them to another agency if they
move themselves. 88 Contingent commissions ensure the viability of small
insurance agencies in the face of this asymmetric bargaining power, the
argument goes, because they are typically paid only at year's end and are thus
largely invisible to the agency's employee-agents. 89  As such, these
commissions can be surreptitiously retained by the agency and used to pay for
its basic expenses.
The argument that banning contingent commissions will bankrupt an
inefficiently large number of small independent insurance agencies ignores
economic forces in two related ways. First, it is highly unlikely that insurance
agents' compensation depends on the visibility to agents of their employers'
profits. In competitive labor markets, 90 employees' wages are set by their
marginal value to their firms. Employees need not know precisely how much
they contribute to their employers' bottom line for this to be so: if they contribute
more than they are paid, then a competing firm will offer them a higher wage. If
86. Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3042; see also Albert Lloyd & Craig Niess, The Impact of
Contingent Commissions on Independent Agents, INS. J., Mar. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/east/2007/03/12/features/78016.htm ("The very ability of
an agency to service and support itself hinges on the fact that contingents are considered a legitimate
revenue stream."). Fitzpatrick does not argue that contingent commissions are necessary for the survival
of small, niche insurance brokers. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3059. The reason, presumably, is that
the brokerage market is much more consolidated than the insurance agency market, and so it seems less
plausible that independent agents can demand salaries in excess of their value to their employer-brokers.
87. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3058-59.
88. Id. at 3058.
89. See id. at 3059 (arguing that smaller, independent intermediaries have long attempted to
"preserve the confidentiality of contingent commission arrangements" in order to "keep[] such
information from the agency's own employees," because "contingent commissions provide a vital pool
of 'house' money that funds the basic overhead of their firms," without which many of these
intermediaries could not remain in business).
90. The argument discussed in this Subsection clearly rests on the assumption that markets for
insurance intermediaries are indeed competitive. To the extent they are not, then the underlying
argument that contingent commissions are necessary to protect small insurance agencies falls flat.
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they contribute less, they will be fired or their wage will be decreased. 91 Second,
if banning contingent commissions would indeed bankrupt some small insurance
agencies for the reasons described above, then this would probably be a good
outcome. The premise underlying this defense of contingent commissions is that
some insurance agencies have only been able to maintain their presence in the
marketplace by concealing from their employees the true extent to which these
employees contribute to overall profits. But if this is so, then the costs incurred
by agencies in supporting their agents-by providing advertising, coordinated
filing services, office space in which to meet customers, and the like-must be
less than the value of those expenditures. And in that case, the efficient outcome
would be for the individual agent to move to another agency that adds enough
value to the overall transaction to cover its costs.
92
3. Contingent Commissions as a Protector of Small Insurers
A third defense of contingent commissions is that they may allow relatively
small insurers to enter the market more easily by inducing independent
intermediaries to steer customers to new insurers. Although intermediaries
might ordinarily stay away from new insurers that have not developed a
reputation, contingent commissions can induce them to go with these insurers
by offering them what amounts to a "bonus" payment. Ultimately, the
argument goes, this is beneficial for the competitiveness of the insurance
market because it reduces barriers to entry.
9 3
This argument in favor of contingent commissions is also limited, though
its recognition of the impact that contingent commissions can have on
intermediaries' behavior is noteworthy. In many markets where reputation is
important, new entrants may find it advantageous to provide heavy discounts
that cannot be sustained in the long run. This strategy allows new firms to gain
some initial market penetration and, more importantly, to credibly signal to
consumers that the firm believes in its products: after all, the firm's strategy is a
losing one if consumers who initially move to the firm to take advantage of its
low prices do not then stay with the firm once prices have normalized. 94 But
there is little reason why such promotional discounts need be made to insurance
intermediaries, as opposed to insureds themselves in the form of lower prices.
To the extent that new insurers offer lower premiums that offset their weaker
91. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 378 (10th
ed. 2005).
92. The only potential reason this might not be true is if the resulting industry structure were
uncompetitive. But it is hard to imagine that, even if contingent commissions do artificially prop up
some insurance agencies, banning them would fundamentally alter the composition of the marketplace
such that a competitive marketplace would be transformed into a uncompetitive marketplace.
93. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 385-86.
94. See William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 49, 68 (1996).
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reputation, at least some intermediaries are likely to recommend this option to
their customers. And while this strategy may not be as effective as contingent
commissions in quickly recruiting new clients, such reduced premiums signal
equally well to the marketplace that the insurer believes in the product that it
provides.95 Because this signal, rather than the initial influx of business that
accompanies it, is the crucial mechanism by which new entrants establish
themselves with low initial rates, contingent commissions are not necessary to
reduce barriers to entry in insurance markets.
4. Contingent Commissions as a Facilitator of Limited Insurer-
Intermediary Interactions
A final argument in favor of contingent commissions is that these payments
may promote efficiency by inducing agents to focus on selling the policies of a
limited number of insurers. In many ways, this argument is simply the flip side
of the steering argument described above. 96 Just as contingent commissions
may cause intermediaries to steer their customers to suboptimal insurance, they
may also cause intermediaries to focus their sales efforts on a few insurers who
pay the largest contingent commissions. This may reduce transaction costs: it is
presumably cheaper for agents to focus on the mechanics of selling only a few
insurers' products. Insurers, as well, may benefit from receiving customers
through a limited array of familiar independent intermediaries, assuming the
number of customers remains constant.
This defense of contingent commissions is ultimately insignificant.
Independent intermediaries certainly incur a cost when they choose to sell an
additional insurer's policy line. But contingent commissions are not necessary
to ensure that intermediaries appropriately account for this cost in their
decision-making. Intermediaries directly bear this cost, whether or not they are
paid contingent commissions. By contrast, if there are costs to the insurer from
selling policies to the customers of an unfamiliar intermediary, then it is true
that the intermediary may not take these costs into account in deciding how to
direct its customers. If so, then contingent commissions might promote
efficiency. Yet it is hard to imagine that the non-underwriting costs9 7 to an
insurer of receiving a client from a relatively less familiar intermediary are
substantial. By necessity, insurers that sell their products through independent
intermediaries must be adept at the mechanics of providing coverage for
95. Even if intermediaries could not be trusted to recommend insurers who provided promotional
discounts on premiums, there is no reason why new insurers could not compensate intermediaries using
methods other than contingent commissions, such as higher premium-based commissions.
96. See supra Section I.A.
97. To the extent that insurers who distribute their policies through independent intermediaries do
enjoy underwriting efficiencies from dealing with familiar intermediaries, this argument collapses into
the adverse selection argument, described in Section IB, supra.
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customers referred by hundreds of different intermediaries. This is true whether
or not the insurer offers contingent commissions: even an insurer that pays
contingent commissions to only a few independent agents will receive business
from hundreds of independent intermediaries.
98
II. CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS IN CONSUMER INSURANCE MARKETS
The emerging consensus among lawmakers and commentators is that, given
the competing costs and benefits of contingent commissions, these payments
should be permitted in consumer insurance markets so long as they are
appropriately disclosed to consumers.99 Such a disclosure regime is primarily
intended to limit the core potential cost of contingent commissions-that they
cause intermediaries to steer consumers to suboptimal insurance. 00 At the same
time, a disclosure-based response does not interfere with the potential of
contingent commissions to reduce adverse selection.
This Part challenges the argument that disclosure is a sufficient regulatory
or legislative response to contingent commission payments in consumer
insurance markets. Drawing on the experiences of regulators in addressing
other trilateral dilemmas, Section A argues that the core cost of contingent
commissions-the risk of steering-is both significant and largely intractable
when consumers purchase insurance through intermediaries that accept
98. Although the marginal cost of processing customers from an entirely new intermediary may be
significant, this is likely to be a one-time cost for the insurer: the intermediary's name and address must
be placed in the computer, and the intermediary will likely have to sign a distribution contract. However,
the effect that contingent commissions have on the ultimate number of independent intermediaries from
which an insurer receives business is likely trivial.
99. The leading model legislation, drafted by the National Conference of Insurance Legislatures,
requires disclosure only when a producer is paid by both the insurance consumer and the insurer-a rare
occurrence. That disclosure must acknowledge that "compensation [from an insurer] will be received by
the producer or affiliate," and the customer must receive "a description of the method and factors
utilized for calculating the compensation to be received from the insurer or other third party for that
placement." PRODUCER COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE MODEL, AMENDMENT TO THE PRODUCER
LICENSING MODEL ACT § I(A)(1) (Nat'l Conference of Ins. Legislators 2005), http://www.aba.com/
aba/documents/abia/NCOILFinalMarkup.pdf. Another, more effective proposal would inform the
insurance consumer in all circumstances that:
OUR FIRM HAS AGENCY CONTRACTS WITH THE FOLLOWING INSURANCE
COMPANIES: _
IF YOU CHOOSE, OUR FIRM WILL ACT AS A "DUAL AGENT," REPRESENTING
BOTH YOU AND THE INSURERS WHO HAVE APPOINTED US, IN YOUR
INSURANCE PURCHASE. IF WE ACT AS A "DUAL AGENT," WE WILL BE
COMPENSATED ON A COMMISSION BASIS, WITH OUR COMMISSION BEING
INCLUDED IN YOUR POLICY PREMIUM AND PAID BY THE INSURER YOU
SELECT. WE MAY ALSO BE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL
COMPENSATION FROM THAT INSURER BASED ON THE OVERALL VOLUME AND
PROFITABILITY OF THE POLICIES WE WRITE WITH THAT INSURER.
INFORMATION ABOUT SUCH ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR WHICH OUR
FIRM MAY BE ELIGIBLE CAN BE FOUND ON OUR WEB SITE, AND IS ALSO
PROVIDED BY THE INSURERS WE REPRESENT ON THEIR WEB SITES.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3069-70.
100. See supra Section I.A.
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contingent commissions. The mere disclosure of contingent commissions does
not meaningfully alter this risk, which is largely a function of inherent
informational asymmetries between consumers and intermediaries. Nor does
disclosure of any type allow consumers to assess meaningfully the magnitude
or probability of this risk.10° Section B continues by arguing that the primary
theoretical benefit of contingent commissions-their capacity to mitigate
adverse selection-is insignificant in consumer insurance markets. Even if
adverse selection were a serious concern in these markets, contingent
commissions might not actually improve the information about consumer-
insureds that insurers receive from independent intermediaries. Weighing the
core costs and benefits of contingent commissions, Section C concludes that
regulators or legislatures should ban these payments in consumer insurance
markets.
A. Disclosure, Steering, and Trilateral Dilemmas
Although contingent commissions have only recently emerged as a
significant issue for regulators and legislatures, government officials have
frequently addressed analogous consumer market problems, known as
"trilateral dilemmas." In a trilateral dilemma, market intermediaries extract side
payments from other professionals in exchange for steering business to them. 1
2
Trilateral dilemmas involve three parties: a consumer, a market intermediary
that influences the consumer's decisions about hiring additional service
providers, and a third-party service provider. In these situations, the third-party
service provider may make side payments to the market intermediary in
exchange for its referral of business.' 0 3 For instance, when consumers purchase
a home, they typically rely on a number of market intermediaries, such as
realtors and mortgage brokers, who themselves provide advice on choosing
additional service providers such as lawyers and lending institutions. In such
circumstances, the intermediary (the realtor or mortgage broker) may advise the
customer to choose a particular service provider (a lawyer or lending
institution) based on whether that service provider makes a side payment to the
intermediary.' 0 4 Another prominent example of a trilateral dilemma is the
potential that investment managers (market intermediaries) will select
particular brokerage firms to execute trades on behalf of the investor based on
10 1. These arguments thus pose a direct challenge to the claim made by defenders of contingent
commissions that competition in the insurance industry will eliminate the inefficiencies associated with
contingent commissions. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
102. Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 25.
103. See id.
104. See id. One recent and controversial example of this concerns the propriety of mortgage
brokers receiving "yield-spread" premiums from their lending institutions. See also Kathleen C. Engel &
Patricia McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1255, 1264 (2002).
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the brokerage firm's side payments to the investment manager.'05
In many, if not most, trilateral dilemmas, legislatures and regulators have
determined that the risk that intermediaries will provide biased advice to their
customers is significant, and that it cannot be sufficiently ameliorated by using
disclosure to foster competition.' °6 For instance, one of the goals of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) of 1974107 is to protect consumers
from exploitation associated with biased advice from real estate
intermediaries. 10 8 To do so, section 8 of RESPA not only erects certain
disclosure requirements, but also flatly prohibits a variety of side payments to
real estate settlement providers.109 Similarly, section 28(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934110 is partly intended to limit the risks associated with
side payments to investment managers.' It not only requires that investment
managers disclose the side payments that they receive from brokerage firms,
but also limits the types of side payments that can be made: brokerage firms
can only provide side payments to investment managers in the form of
"brokerage and research services" that redound to the benefit of clients.'
12
Recently, public pressure to eliminate even these very narrow side payments
has increased.1 13 Other instances of trilateral dilemmas that are regulated in
ways that extend beyond mere disclosure include employers' choices of 401(k)
providers and bankers' arrangements with telemarketers.
114
For each of these trilateral dilemmas, there are three basic reasons why
disclosure has only a limited capacity to facilitate competition and thus to
protect consumers from receiving biased advice. First, for disclosure to allow
for an effective market response, consumers must have a basic understanding of
105. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 25.
106. See id.
107. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2000).
108. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 25. As Jackson and Burlingame explain, see id.,
RESPA was partially motivated by a government study that concluded that the payment of kickbacks in
real estate sales was "widely employed, rarely inure[s] to the benefit of the home buyer, and generally
increase[s] total settlement costs." U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. & URBAN DEV. & THE VETERANs ADMIN.,
HUD-F-5, REPORT ON MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT COSTS 5 (1972). Although the study actually
recommended that Congress set maximum settlement costs, Congress ultimately took a less drastic
measure in RESPA by prohibiting kickbacks and unearned fees and creating a private right of action.
See 12 U.S.C. § 2607. For a popular account of the conflicts of interest associated with real estate
brokers, see STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 55-89 (2005).
109. 12 U.S.C. § 2607.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000).
111. See Lee B. Burgunder & Karl 0. Hartmann, Soft Dollars and Section 28(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: A 1985 Perspective, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 139 (1986); D. Bruce Johnsen, Property
Rights to Investment Research: The Agency Costs to Soft Dollar Brokerage, II YALE J. ON REG. 75, 83
(1994); Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of
Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 951, 971
(2005).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1).
113. See Benn Steil, Op-Ed, The Soft Dollar Scandal, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2006, at A15.
114. Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 25.
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the underlying services they are receiving and the prices those services should
cost. 115 Otherwise, consumers will be unable to assess whether their end service
providers are charging too much or providing too little, even if they know that
this is potentially the case. In most trilateral dilemmas, however, consumers do
not understand much about the underlying services they are purchasing; that is
precisely why they seek out the advice of an intermediary. Second, even when
disclosure effectively informs some sophisticated consumers, competition
cannot protect the interests of other, less sophisticated consumers if
intermediaries can distinguish between these two groups and can offer advice
accordingly.1 16 Such discrimination is easy in the case of many trilateral
dilemmas, as intermediaries typically know a lot about their customers and are
specifically trained to provide individualized advice to them.117 Third,
disclosure may be ineffective when intermediaries have a position of power
over-or a relationship of trust with-consumers, as they often do in trilateral
dilemmas. 118 In such circumstances, consumers will be more likely to ignore
the prospect that financial incentives will cause an intermediary to offer biased
advice.
These explanations for the limited capacity of disclosure and competition to
protect consumers in most trilateral dilemmas apply squarely to contingent
commissions in consumer insurance markets. First and most importantly,
insurance consumers typically have a limited understanding of the underlying
insurance transaction that no conceivable disclosure could remedy. Even
assuming that consumers would read and understand a contingent commission
115. Id. at 43; cf Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. I (arguing that certain firms' financial arrangements, such as those of
Enron, are so complex that regulation should go beyond a disclosure-based paradigm).
116. See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of the Informed
Minority To Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 675 (1998); Avery Wiener Katz,
Standard Form Contracts, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 502,
504-05 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
117. For instance, litigation has uncovered various cases of such discrimination by lending agents.
See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two INCOME TRAP 135-36 (2003) (quoting
one loan officer who explained that "if someone appeared uneducated, inarticulate, was a minority, or
was particularly old or young, I would try to include all the [additional costs] CitiFinancial offered"
(alteration in original)). Another well-documented example of this phenomenon occurs in the
automobile context, where salesmen are given wide latitude to negotiate prices so that less sophisticated
consumers who do not know better can be charged more, while the business of more sophisticated
consumers can be retained by significantly lowering the car's price below the sticker amount. See Ian
Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV.
817, 845 (1991) (finding evidence that automobile retailers sell cars for higher prices to minorities, and
suggesting that part of the reason may be that sellers use race as a proxy for how much consumers shop
for better prices); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and
Estimates ofIts Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 138-40 (1995) (similar).
118. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 25. Jackson and Burlingame note an additional reason
why market forces may not correct for side payments in many trilateral dilemmas: intermediaries
typically purchase a wide array of settlement services, and the consumer has a limited capacity to
monitor all of these at once. This is less of an issue in the insurance context, as the intermediary
generally only arranges for a single service provider. See id.
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disclosure-a generous and limited assumption" 9- they will be ill-equipped to
police the underlying conflict of interest or to assess its significance. Insurance
consumers generally do not know how to assess the quality of different
insurance options: the risks associated with an insurer's "fair" financial rating,
for instance, are beyond the ken of most insurance consumers, including many
small businesses and otherwise savvy individuals.1 20 Similarly, most insurance
consumers have no idea which insurers have a poor reputation for claims
management or use insurance policies that are narrower than the standardized
coverage forms. 12  Indeed, it is precisely for these reasons that consumers
choose to rely on independent insurance intermediaries. 12
Without the ability to assess the quality of different insurance options, even
consumers who are aware of contingent commissions are susceptible to being
steered to insurers that are too expensive, of low quality, or otherwise
inappropriate. Although informed consumers can compare the prices available
through different intermediaries or the relative commissions that intermediaries
receive, these comparisons are largely unhelpful when they are decoupled from
the ability to assess the quality of the associated insurance options. Insurance
may appear reasonably priced even if it is actually quite expensive for the level
of coverage and services provided, while more expensive insurance may in fact
be the best deal for the consumer.' z3 Similarly, the mere fact that an
intermediary receives a large contingent commission from a recommended
insurer hardly means that her advice is necessarily suspect. Without some
119. See Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an
Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, I YALE J. ON REG. 159, 161 (1984); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual
Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 650 (1996).
In order for disclosures to be effective, consumers must, of course, read and understand them. But
consumers often do not read long and complicated disclosures, and frequently do not understand them
when they do. See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1242 (1994). To the extent that lawmakers do indeed opt for a disclosure-based
solution, supplemental compensation arrangements can significantly improve the effectiveness of
disclosure by reducing the complexities of contingent commission arrangements to a single number that
indicates the size of the intermediaries' conflict of interest. See infra notes 163-164 and accompanying
text.
120. Cf James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of
Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1055 (1992) (noting that insureds are
generally uninformed about their insurance needs).
121. See Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1413-15 (describing the limits of reputation as a vehicle for
informing insurance consumers about the quality of their insurance options); id. at 1417-18 (describing
how some mega-insurers can use policy language that is narrower than industry norms because they can
generate their own actuarial data and enjoy other economies of scale in drafting policy language).
122. See Slawson, supra note 55, at 547 ("[The average consumer] depends on an insurance agent
and insurance company to sell him a policy that 'works' for its intended purpose in much the same way
that he depends on a television salesman and television manufacturer.").
123. This variation in product quality, in addition to price, is part of what distinguishes the conflicts
of interests associated with contingent commissions from those associated with premium commissions.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Unlike contingent commissions, premium commissions do
not create any incentive for intermediaries to sell insurance of similar price but lower quality as
compared to alternative policies.
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capacity to independently evaluate the intermediary's advice, price and
commission information is of limited use. 
124
It is precisely because insurance is so difficult for most consumers to
understand that the dominant method of regulating the industry is through
mandatory requirements and prohibitions rather than disclosure-based schemes.
Insurance policies are in many ways the most complex financial services that
firms offer on the open market because their value is contingent on the
insurer's underlying financial stability, the content of the policy itself, and
events unrelated to the insurer's assets or the governing contract. 125 Contrast
these characteristics with securities and mutual funds, for example, whose
value can be ascertained based solely on the governing contract and the
companies' assets. I26 This differential in inherent complexity explains why
securities and mutual funds are typically regulated via relatively nonintrusive
measures (such as disclosure and general standards of conduct), whereas
insurance regulation often takes the form of specific requirements or
prohibitions (such as capital requirements). 127 Recall, however, that when it
comes to trilateral dilemmas in the mutual fund industry, the regulatory strategy
of the Securities Exchange Act has uncharacteristically gone beyond disclosure
because of concerns that investors could be steered to overly expensive
brokerage services. 128 If the opaqueness of the services that brokerage firms
124. Spitzer's investigation of Marsh & McLennan provides modest evidence of the insufficiency
of disclosure when insurance purchasers have a limited understanding of the underlying insurance
product. Cf Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3047-52 (suggesting that Marsh was unique and that its bid
rigging cannot be extrapolated to the rest of the industry). These investigations revealed that Marsh
brokers solicited purposefully inflated price quotations from some insurers in order to steer clients to
other insurers and to maximize Marsh's receipt of contingent commissions. See Marsh Complaint, supra
note 10, 43-66. Marsh's customers were highly sophisticated firms, at least some of whose risk
managers were undoubtedly aware of contingent commission payments. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at
3049 n.33 (noting that insurers publicly report the payment of contingent commissions in their annual
statements filed with the state insurance department). Yet Marsh's bid-rigging rendered these firms
unsophisticated as to the appropriate pricing of their policies, enabling Marsh to steer them to
suboptimal insurance. The fact that Marsh employees were willing to take this risk may, as others have
pointed out, have been an unfortunate result of the company's internal structure. See Fitzpatrick, supra
note 3, at 3047 (noting that Marsh's Global Broking division-the division in which all of the bid-
rigging took place--derived its income solely from its receipt of contingent commissions). But the fact
that they were able to succeed, at least for a significant period of time, suggests how easy it can be for
knowledgeable intermediaries to offer questionable, debatable, or even flatly wrong advice to customers
who may be abstractly aware of a potential conflict of interest. See Hunter, supra note 11, at 2 ("If large
sophisticated consumers of insurance can be easily cheated and overcharged, unsophisticated individual
and small business buyers are even more vulnerable to such sharp practices.").
125. See Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An
Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 330, 356-57 (1999) (explaining that insurance is a
particularly complex financial arrangement because the assets and liabilities of insurance companies are
hard to determine).
126. See id. at 323-25 (securities); id. at 327-28 (mutual funds). See generally HOWELL E. JACKSON
& EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1999) (exploring differences in
the regulation of various financial services industries and suggesting that many of these differences are
attributable to the level of complexity associated with the target industry).
127. See Jackson, supra note 125, at 353-60.
128. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
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provide for investors warrants a solution to that trilateral dilemma beyond
disclosure, then the same should presumably be true in the context of a more
complex financial service.
The second reason that market forces do not protect consumers from most
trilateral dilemmas-that intermediaries can distinguish between sophisticated
and unsophisticated consumers-also applies in the contingent commission
context. When intermediaries can identify unsophisticated consumers, they can
steer them to less qualified service providers who make lucrative side payments
to the intermediary while directing sophisticated purchasers to objectively
superior insurers. Intermediaries can thereby exploit unsophisticated consumers
without suffering any serious market penalties for doing so. 129 Insurance
intermediaries are particularly likely to be able to identify and steer uninformed
insurance customers in this way because of the close contact they have with
their clients. Disclosure does nothing to limit this risk. In fact, disclosure may
actually help intermediaries to assess the sophistication and responsiveness of
their customers by providing a test of an insurance consumer's relative
skepticism and sophistication. Insureds who read a disclosure and ask follow-
up questions displaying an understanding of the underlying conflict of interest
are relatively less likely to overlook inefficient steering to suboptimal insurers.
By contrast, consumers who quickly sign a disclosure without reading the text,
or who seem to misunderstand the meaning of the disclosure, will be much
more enticing targets for self-interested producers predisposed to steering.
An empirical study of an Arizona independent insurance agency
substantiates the risks of such discrimination against unsophisticated consumers
by insurance intermediaries. 130 The agency, which remained unidentified,
employed eight agents with no ownership stake in the company and three
"equity agents" who received a portion of the agency's profits.' 3 1 Because the
contingent commissions the company received were paid directly to the
company, the three equity agents stood to gain more from maximizing
contingent commissions than did the nonequity agents. Additionally, only the
equity agents handled "house" accounts, which (1) either originated in another
agency that the company subsequently acquired or had originally been handled
by an agent who had retired, and (2) did not fit the portfolio or expertise of any
nonequity agent. 132 The defining characteristics of the customers in these house
accounts strongly suggest that they were less sensitive than other agency
customers to the level of service they received from their agent. This
hypothesis was corroborated by the fact that house accounts were three times
more likely than other accounts to pay their premiums directly to their insurer,
129. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
130. See Wilder, supra note 37, at 1-3.
131. Id. at 6.
132. Id.
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rather than to pay them through the agency, indicating disengagement with
their insurance agent.133 The study concluded that contingent commissions
significantly impacted the recommendations that the equity agents gave to their
less responsive consumers, finding that "the prospect of contingency fees [led]
equity agents to increase the frequency with which they placed house accounts
with insurers offering contingency fees by more than 50%.,,134 In other words,
equity insurance agents matched customers with different insurers depending
on customers' responsiveness, steering less responsive customers toward
insurers that paid the agency contingent commissions. 35
A third reason that mere disclosure and competition cannot resolve many
trilateral dilemmas is that the relationship between market intermediaries and
their consumers often induces trust and reliance that limit consumers'
willingness to question the advice they receive.1 36 Once again, this concern is
significant in the insurance context. Many consumers develop longstanding
relationships with their agents or brokers that induce both reliance and trust.
Indeed, because of the complexities of insurance, an intermediary's capacity to
recommend proper coverage often critically depends on how well the
intermediary understands the consumer's particular needs.1 37 Independent
intermediaries therefore devote significant resources toward cultivating the
trust of their clients.' 38 As a result, intermediaries can sugarcoat potential
deficiencies in insurance coverage and may avoid having to deal with them at
all.1 39 Of the few customers who inquire about their prospective insurer's
financial strength, virtually none will challenge their intermediary's cursory
response that the insurer's capacity to pay claims is good-regardless of
whether they are aware of their intermediary's potential conflict of interest.
This is particularly true given that insurance consumers must make numerous
decisions about unfamiliar matters, such as deductibles, policy limits,
endorsement options, and alterative insurers.'40
133. Seeid. at 7-8.
134. Id. at 10.
135. Although equity agents also tended to place a disproportionate percentage of their customers
with insurers that maintained contingent commission contracts with the agency, the statistical
significance of this effect was unclear. Id.
136. This concern, for instance, was one of the motivating factors that led Congress to regulate the
trilateral dilemma involving real estate intermediaries in RESPA. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra note
25.
137. See infra notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
139. See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and
Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1395, 1400-16 (1994).
140. Although any meaningful disclosure of contingent commissions would presumably occur
before discussion of these matters, few consumers will literally walk out the door of a broker or agent
upon seeing a disclosure form. Rather, to the extent that a disclosure can influence a customer's decision
about purchasing insurance through an intermediary, it is likely to do so after the customer has gathered
basic information about the insurance options available through the intermediary.
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Competition, even when it is facilitated by a disclosure requirement, is thus
ultimately limited in its capacity to protect insurance consumers from being
steered to inappropriate or overly expensive insurance. Although contingent
commissions represent only a small portion of intermediaries' total.. 141
compensation, they can nonetheless tempt intermediaries to provide biased
advice to their customers, as the Arizona insurance agency study demonstrates.
Competition can do little to check this temptation, even when the potential risk
of steering is disclosed, because consumers have a limited capacity to identify
biased advice from their intermediary. And when consumers do spot trouble,
intermediaries can quickly change their tune, thus retaining the business of
sophisticated insureds while continuing to exploit less sophisticated customers.
Often not even this adjustment will be necessary, as intermediaries will be able
to overcome consumers' potential concerns by invoking the relationship of trust
that exists between them.
B. Evaluating the Adverse Selection Argument
The primary defense of contingent commissions is that they may reduce
adverse selection by inducing intermediaries to convey risk information to
insurers that the latter would otherwise be unable to observe. 142 Although
theoretically sound, this argument suffers from three significant limitations
when it comes to consumer insurance markets. First, while adverse selection is
a commonly theorized problem, the available empirical evidence suggests that
it is not nearly as significant a problem in consumer insurance markets as the
wealth of theoretical literature suggests. As a recent article by Professor Peter
Siegelman explores in detail, 143  empirical studies on long-term care
insurance, 144 term life insurance, 14  health insurance, 146 and automobile
insurance 147 have each found no evidence of adverse selection. 148 There are
141. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
142. See supra Section I.B.
143. See generally Siegelman, supra note 28.
144. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence
from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 938 (2006).
145. Mark V. Pauly et al., Price Elasticity of Demand for Term Life Insurance and Adverse
Selection (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9925, 2003), available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9925.pdf.
146. James H. Cardon & Igal Hendel, Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from
the National Medical Expenditure Survey, 32 RAND J. ECON. 408 (2001).
147. Georges Dionne et al., Testing for Evidence ofAdverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance
Market: A Comment, 109 J. POL. ECON. 444 (2001).
148. The most compelling exception to this trend is a famous article documenting adverse selection
in a health insurance market in which employee-insureds were able to select between alternative health
insurance plans offered as a part of a subsidized group plan through an employer. David M. Cutler &
Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, I FRONTIERS HEALTH POL'Y RES. I
(1998). But the risks of adverse selection in such "cafeteria style" insurance arrangements are unique.
Thomas Buchmueller & John DiNardo, Did Community Rating Induce an Adverse Selection Death
Spiral? Evidence from New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 280, 280-81
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various potential explanations for the persistent finding that most consumer
insurance markets do not suffer from adverse selection. In many cases, such as
life insurance, it is likely that insureds often do not have better information
about their risk levels than insurers once contractually required disclosures by
insureds are taken into account.1 49 In other instances, such as automobile
insurance, insureds may not be able to translate whatever informational
advantage they have into better predictions about their risk levels than those
generated by expert insurers.' 50 This is particularly likely given emerging
evidence that lay people are more subject to systematic cognitive biases than
experts. 151 A third explanation for the lack of adverse selection in most
consumer insurance markets is that low-risk individuals also tend to be
relatively risk-averse. This risk aversion leads low-risk individuals to value
insurance more highly than high-risk individuals, which tends to counteract
adverse selection. 152 Whatever the explanation, though, the evidence seems
clear that adverse selection is not nearly as significant a threat as defenders of
contingent commissions suppose.
The second significant limitation to the adverse selection defense of
contingent commissions is that it is unclear whether intermediaries who receive
such commissions actually transmit better information to insurers than do other
intermediaries. There is significant sociological evidence that captive agents,
who work solely for a given insurer and thus do not receive contingent
commissions, play a nontrivial underwriting role for those insurers.
153
However, the evidence that independent intermediaries also play this
underwriting role when they receive contingent commissions is much less
clear. The likelihood of such complicated information transfer may be low
when it comes to the relatively run-of-the-mill underwriting decisions that
underlie most consumer insurance markets. 54 Such underwriting requires
simple and easily administrable algorithms,' 55 which may well preclude
(2002). Moreover, because group insurance arrangements do not involve independent intermediaries at
the level of consumers, contingent commission payments do not, of course, have any prospect of
improving adverse selection in these markets.
149. Siegelman, supra note 28, at 1241.
150. See id. at 1242-47.
151. Nonexperts tend to place too much importance on salient events, to be overly optimistic in
assessing their own risk levels, to treat low risk-levels as equivalent to zero, and to over-estimate the
likelihood of affect-laden risks, such as that associated with nuclear waste. See Cass Sunstein, The Laws
of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1119 (2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)).
Experts, by contrast, can avoid such errors by focusing on a defined set of limited variables and by
employing methods that tend to debias their results. See id. at 1144-56.
152. See Siegelman, supra note 28, at 1264-74.
153. See supra note 64.
154. See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
155. See KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 78 (1986) ("[A]n efficient classification system
does not strive to make its premiums equal expected cost beyond the point where that goal is worth
achieving.").
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incorporating nuanced information conveyed by intermediaries., 
56
Finally, to the extent that insurers do indeed use information from
intermediaries to make underwriting decisions, contingent commissions may
not improve either the quality or the reliability of this information. An
insurance company can generally monitor the type of insureds an intermediary
refers to it merely by evaluating the loss ratio-a measure of insurer
profitability'57--of the intermediary's book of business. Insurers maintain loss
ratios for each of their independent intermediaries in the ordinary course of
business, and they can easily use those measures to determine whether an
intermediary's book of business generates more or less profit than the initial
underwriting criteria suggested it would. Insurers can adjust their willingness to
take insureds from particular intermediaries accordingly. Consequently,
although contingent commissions may indirectly create an incentive for
intermediaries to keep their loss ratios at a profitable level, 158 they are hardly
necessary for this purpose given the more direct methods available to
insurers--dropping, or threatening to drop, intermediaries with a consistently
poor loss ratio. And unlike the defense of contingent commissions, this
monitoring is not simply theoretical. 159 As one independent insurance agency
operator explained, his agency "guarded [its] loss ratio very, very carefully
because having a good loss ratio over the book of business is what enables you
to negotiate favorable rates and go to new insurers and sign them up if you
need them."' 160 Most insurers, the agent explained, carefully consider the loss
ratios in agencies' books of business when deciding whether to do business
with them.
1 61
C. Toward Banning Contingent Commissions
In consumer insurance markets, contingent commissions pose serious
conflicts of interest for ostensibly independent intermediaries. They encourage
these intermediaries to pursue higher commission rates rather than guide their
156. For this reason, "[i]ndividual companies are increasingly less likely to undertake their own
home inspections or direct field investigation of an applicant. Instead, moral risk assessment is
centralizing into data systems operated by information service companies that supply the insurance
industry." See ERICKSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 241.
157. Seesupra note 37.
158. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
159. Indeed, one underwriting manager for a multinational insurer has stated that "we have
expressed to [brokers] time and again and built up over time what our likes and dislikes are from an
underwriting standpoint." If the broker can demonstrate that its "risks fit," then the insurer "pursue[s] it
aggressively... [,] cut[ting] incentive commission deals" for the broker. ERICKSON ET AL., supra note
64, at 227. Similarly, another underwriter explained that costs are often too high for insurers to
investigate each potential insured on their own, and they often, therefore, need to "take a little bit on
trust ... dealing with the right broker." Id. at 241.
160. Id. at 247.
161. Id. at 248.
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customers to the insurance that best meets their needs or is most affordable.
This conflict of interest is particularly problematic in insurance markets
because consumers have an inherently limited understanding of their insurance
needs and options. They often cannot, therefore, make optimal purchasing
decisions without unbiased advice. Indeed, independent intermediaries justify
their very existence on this basis, promising to look after their customers'
needs. Given this fundamental information asymmetry, as well as the dynamics
of the intermediary-customer relationship, disclosing contingent commissions
to consumers will ultimately do little to mitigate the conflicts of interest that
contingent commissions generate. Indeed, lawmakers have consistently
recognized as much in the case of structurally similar trilateral dilemmas that
plague other industries.'
62
Meanwhile, the core defense of contingent commissions-that they reduce
adverse selection by aligning the incentives of intermediaries and insurers-is
largely illusory and is based on suspect assumptions when it comes to
consumer insurance markets. Adverse selection is simply not a significant
problem in consumer insurance markets. Even if it were shown to be a genuine
problem, the claim that contingent commissions can actually alleviate the
problem is both empirically unsupported and logically questionable given the
limited underwriting criteria that most insurers use to price relatively small
risks.
Simple cost-benefit analysis therefore strongly suggests that contingent
commissions ultimately harm insurance consumers. Thus, there is a strong case
to be made that state legislatures and regulators should go beyond a simple
disclosure requirement to address these harms in consumer insurance markets.
One intriguing, but ultimately limited, option is to replace contingent
commissions with "supplemental compensation schemes" that base
intermediaries' commission levels on the volume and profitability of business
162. As is described above, lawmakers have often gone beyond mere disclosure when addressing
trilateral dilemmas in other contexts. See supra notes 102-114 and accompanying text. Admittedly,
though, regulators have not always adopted an outright ban of side payments when faced with a trilateral
dilemma. Section 8 of RESPA, for instance, only prohibits some types of side payments to real estate
intermediaries. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. Similarly, section 28(e) allows
brokerage firms to make side payments to investment managers in the form of investment-related
services. See supra note Ill and accompanying text. In part, these and other moderated responses to
trilateral dilemmas may simply have been the result of political compromise. But they also may
represent wise policy decisions that are driven by factors not present in the contingent commission
context. For instance, some commentators have argued that allowing brokerage firms to pay investment
managers for investment-related services helps to improve securities markets by encouraging managers
to engage in efficient investment research. See. e.g., Johnsen, supra note 11, at 91-104. Without these
payments, the argument goes, investment managers would engage in too little investment research for a
variety of reasons, including the fact that such research redounds to the benefit of all the investment
manager's clients, creating a collective good problem. See id. at 95. Regardless of the persuasiveness of
this argument, there is obviously little that is analogous in the case of contingent commissions.
Ultimately, then, although most trilateral dilemmas tend to be resistant to disclosure-based solutions, the
policy prescription in such cases depends on the specific features of the trilateral dilemma at issue.
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that they have steered toward an insurer in the past. Although some have
suggested that these newly emerging arrangements avoid the conflicts of
interest associated with contingent commissions because they are "retrospective
rather than prospective," 63 this argument is clearly unpersuasive: the
retrospectiveness of supplemental compensation arrangements merely shifts
forward the potential pay-off of steering customers to suboptimal insurance.
Instead of receiving increased contingent commissions in the current pay period
for directing customers to a particular insurer, independent intermediaries will
receive increased supplemental compensation in the next pay period for doing
so.164 Nonetheless, supplemental compensation arrangements, because they are
set prior to the sale of an insurance product, may be easier to disclose to
consumers than contingent commissions: unlike contingent commissions, the
size of which are unknowable at the time of insurance sales, supplemental
compensation arrangements provide intermediaries with a specific and
quantifiable bonus for each additional consumer they direct to the insurer. They
may be preferable to contingent commissions for that reason.
However, even retrospective supplemental compensation schemes coupled
with a strong disclosure requirement are unlikely to limit meaningfully the risks
of inefficient steering. Such schemes do not address the underlying reasons
why disclosure has a limited capacity to protect consumers from trilateral
dilemmas. 165 Regardless of how well consumers understand that their
intermediaries face a potential conflict of interest, consumers are still subject to
inefficient steering because they do not understand the quality and price
tradeoffs of their insurance options. As such, most consumers will be unable to
police the quality of the advice they receive from their intermediaries or to
calculate the expected costs of this limitation. Those that are sophisticated
enough to understand these issues will be unable to protect the interests of
163. Roberts, supra note 16 (quoting Robert A. Rusbuldt, CEO of Independent Insurance Agents
and Brokers of America).
164. Moreover, supplemental compensation schemes would still produce variability in the
commission rates that insurers pay because they link compensation to an individual producer's
"performance" for different insurers. So long as insurers vary their commission rates by the volume of
business directed to it, differentials in commission rates will persist, and so too will the risk of steering.
By contrast, when an insurer offers the same commissions to all intermediaries, regardless of the volume
or profitability of their business, then competition should ensure that commission levels across insurers
remain even for a given type of coverage. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that premium
commissions tend to be quite flat for a given type of insurance, though rigorous evidence on this point is
not currently available. See Money on the Table, supra note 46 (quoting a number of experts who
implicitly agree that premium commissions for a given line of insurance are currently quite flat due to
competition, but who disagree about whether this result would obtain were contingent commissions
banned). Although the size of premium commissions does tend to vary significantly across lines of
insurance, see Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 377-78 tbl.5 (collecting data from the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners), that is hardly surprising, as the role of the intermediary
depends significantly on the line of insurance in question.
165. Indeed, it is for precisely these reasons that the discussion in Section II.A explicitly assumed
that consumers would read and understand a contingent commission disclosure. See supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
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other, less sophisticated, consumers, given the capacity of intermediaries to
distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated insureds. And while an
effective disclosure might constrain the relationship of trust that often exists
between intermediaries and their clients, when it fails to do so consumers will
still be subject to inefficient steering.
Given the inability of creative regulatory restrictions to limit the potential
for inefficient steering, it is likely that the optimal regulatory approach is to ban
contingent commissions in consumer insurance markets.' 66 Indeed, the cost-
benefit analysis described above suggests that the only clear drawback to this
proposal is the administrative cost of implementing the rule. Although the mere
act of banning contingent commissions would not be costly, policing that ban
might be. In particular, insurers could replicate contingent commission
arrangements with retrospective supplemental compensation schemes. This
commission arrangement would be significantly more difficult for regulators to
police because it could be accomplished without the insurers ever publicly
revealing their rationale for offering variable commission rates. Ultimately,
though, a sufficiently clear statute or regulation, combined with a large penalty,
should dissuade insurers from adopting this type of approach. 167 In the final
calculus, then, the benefits of banning contingent commissions and similar
insurer-financed bonuses for independent intermediaries-at least in consumer
insurance markets-are likely to significantly exceed the costs.
III. CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS IN INSURANCE MARKETS WITH
SOPHISTICATED INSUREDS
Although disclosure may be an insufficient response to contingent
commissions in consumer insurance markets, it is less clear whether something
more than disclosure is needed in commercial insurance markets. This Part
explores the likely impact of disclosure in these markets, where insurance
purchasers are far more sophisticated than conventional consumers. It
concludes that there may be sound reasons to consider banning contingent
commissions in the commercial context, but that more empirical research is
needed before a regulatory approach can be confidently embraced.
Section A begins the argument by showing that even if disclosure
166. The inability of supplemental compensation schemes to limit the pernicious effects of
contingent commissions should be contrasted with the soft-money compromise that allows brokerage
firms to pay investment managers for investment-related services. This partial ban, at least in theory,
helps to improve securities markets by encouraging investment managers to engage in efficient
investment research. See Johnsen, supra note 111, at 91-104; see also supra note 162. As is described
above, however, no one has yet proposed a similar partial ban of contingent commissions that could
effectively limit the risk of inefficient steering created by contingent commissions.
167. Another potential strategy for implementing a ban would be to require insurers to pay a single,
market-determined, premium commission rate for a given policy type to all independent intermediaries
with whom they do business.
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meaningfully informs insurance purchasers about the costs of contingent
commissions, market outcomes cannot necessarily be trusted to reflect actual
purchaser preferences. The intuition behind this outcome is that insurance
purchasers who understand the risks of contingent commissions may rationally
choose a market outcome that is inconsistent with their true policy preferences
in order to signal to insurers that they are low-risk. Section B extends this
argument to show that the contingent commissions may have a limited capacity
to mitigate information asymmetries in sophisticated insurance markets, in
which adverse selection may indeed be a significant problem. This Section
presents an alternative model of contingent commissions in which insurance
purchasers are allowed to mimic low-risk insureds when dealing with insurance
intermediaries. Under the model, the benefits of contingent commissions in
reducing adverse selection are smaller than earlier models suggest, and they are
potentially swamped by new, additional costs resulting from high-risk insureds
engaging in socially inefficient strategic behavior.
A. Steering and Signaling in Sophisticated Insurance Markets
Even in insurance markets where insurance purchasers tend to be relatively
sophisticated and informed, disclosure of contingent commissions may fail to
cause purchasers to guard sufficiently against the risk of steering. The basic
reason is that informed and rational insureds who choose to purchase insurance
though non-contingent-commission intermediaries may be penalized for this
decision, as their choice signals to insurers that they are likely to be higher-risk
than their directly observable characteristics suggest.' 68 As defenders of
contingent commissions have argued, 169 intermediaries who accept contingent
commissions may have an incentive to help insurers correctly set prices by
providing them with additional information about insureds' risk levels. But
while accurate pricing improves the efficiency of the insurance market as a
whole, it harms insurance purchasers who are higher-risk than insurers would
otherwise believe. As such, these insureds will seek to hide their high-risk
status. One way of doing so is by purchasing insurance through intermediaries
that do not use contingent commissions-and that therefore do not
communicate additional information to insurers. 170 Given this general
168. The assumption here that purchasers are "informed and rational" means that they understand
that contingent commissions may induce intermediaries to reveal information to insurers. Arguably,
there is an intermediate stage in which purchasers would not understand this implication of contingent
commissions but would be able to determine that the costs of steering are relatively small and make their
decisions accordingly. However, even this intermediate stage of information would still make it difficult
to rely on insurance purchasers' market decisions as expressing their actual preferences. Without
understanding that contingent commissions improve communication between insurers and
intermediaries, purchasers would have little sense of the potential benefits of contingent commissions.
169. See supra Section I.B.
170. A second way for insurance purchasers who pose a higher risk than their clearly observable
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preference, insurers will tend to charge those who purchase insurance though
such intermediaries a higher premium than their observable characteristics
would suggest should be charged.
This result is counterintuitive because, in most markets, effective disclosure
to sophisticated purchasers-whether the underlying risk concerns the potential
safety failure of a product or the prospect that a service will be ineffective-is
enough to ensure that regulatory oversight is not needed. 171 Insurance markets
are different, however, because the purchaser's attributes largely define the
product: the meaning of a promise to pay for specified losses is dependent on
the promisee's likelihood of suffering those losses. For this reason, even if
insurance purchasers are fully informed about contingent commissions (through
disclosure or otherwise), the market cannot be relied upon to produce the
socially optimal result.
A key assumption in this argument-as in the adverse selection defense of
contingent commissions more generally 72-is that insurance intermediaries
can and do communicate insureds' risk levels to insurers when they receive
contingent commissions, but not otherwise. Although this claim is questionable
when it comes to consumer insurance markets, 173 it is more plausible in
commercial insurance markets where the insureds are sophisticated actors.
Underwriting decisions in such insurance markets tend to be less mechanistic
than in consumer markets because they involve more risk, higher premiums,
and more heterogeneous and sophisticated insureds.' 74 This lack of mechanistic
underwriting, combined with lower numbers of insureds per intermediary, may
also limit the capacity of insurers to make inferences about intermediaries
based on their loss ratios. 175 In any event, the assumption that contingent
commissions improve insurer information plays just as vital a role here as it
does in the claim that contingent commissions can reduce adverse selection.
176
To the extent that the assumption is incorrect, both arguments fail. Yet if
characteristics might suggest to hide this fact is to mimic low-risk insureds when dealing with their
insurance agents or brokers. See infra Section III.B. The result described in this Section, whereby
insureds who purchase insurance through non-contingent-commission intermediaries pay a market
penalty, still applies under that alternative assumption.
171. If consumers understand the risks associated with a product or service and nonetheless choose
to purchase it, then they generally must value the product or service more than the combined cost of the
purchase price and expected risk. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
51-53 (1987) (arguing that products liability law is not needed if consumers are informed about product
risks); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983) (arguing that courts should
not intervene in standard form contracts if a sufficiently large minority of consumers are informed about
these contracts).
172. See supra Section I.B.
173. See supra notes 153-160 and accompanying text.
174. Cf supra text accompanying notes 154-156.
175. Cf supra text accompanying notes 157-161.
176. See supra Section 1.B.
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contingent commissions do not reduce adverse selection, then the case for
banning them is clear: there is little reason to permit a costly practice that has
no benefits.
To develop this signaling argument more thoroughly, consider a group of
insureds that, from an insurer's perspective, all have the same observable risk
level, designated Ro. Suppose that each insured also has one of two actual risk
levels, which are equally distributed among the population. 177 Some insureds,
designated RL, have a lower actual risk level than their observable
characteristics suggest, and some insureds, RH, are actually more risky than
their observable characteristics indicate. For ease of discussion, let us define
the difference between insureds' actual risk levels and their observed risk levels
as their "residual risk." Thus, RL types have a negative residual risk and RH
types have a positive residual risk. Both RL and RH know their own risk types.
Suppose further that insureds can purchase insurance through two types of
intermediaries, 178 both of which are capable of identifying whether an
insurance purchaser is RH or RL. Some intermediaries, designated CC, receive
contingent commissions and, for this reason, will credibly communicate an
insured's residual risk level to insurers. Doing so allows the intermediary to
maximize contingent commissions because it facilitates the appropriate pricing
of policies. Other intermediaries, designated NCC, do not receive contingent
commissions and therefore do not contribute to the insurer's underwriting
efforts by transmitting information about potential insureds' residual risk.
179
This simple model helps illustrate why, if informed purchasers are allowed
to choose between CC and NCC intermediaries, insurers will rationally
conclude that those who choose an NCC intermediary are more likely that not
to have a high residual risk (RH). RH types will generally have an incentive to
hide their residual risk from insurers so that they are not charged an actuarially
fair premium, which is higher than they would otherwise pay. They cannot do
so by going to a CC intermediary, as the CC intermediary conveys this risk
177. This is not nearly as strong an assumption as it first appears to be. Insurers are generally
thought to be quite good at calculating roughly accurate averages of risk levels across defined
populations. If the average risk level is close to the median, then there will be an approximately equal
number of people who are more risky than average compared to those who are less risky than average.
178. This assumption can be challenged because purchasers can bypass intermediaries altogether
and obtain insurance through an insurer that offers direct underwriting, either over the phone or the
Internet. ABRAHAM, supra note 13, at 56. But this option, of course, requires completely foregoing the
advice of an intermediary who can identify insurance needs and suggest various options. Moreover, it is
only available from a limited number of insurers for a limited number of insurance lines, such as
automobile and homeowners insurance. See id.
179. Another objection is that under some reform proposals, insureds can force an agency not to
accept contingent commissions. In this scenario, a single agent or broker would accept contingent
commissions or not depending on each client's stated preference. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3069-
70. This scenario, however, would not impact the analysis because insurers, of course, would know in
any given case whether an agent or broker was accepting contingent commissions. They could therefore
simply treat the intermediary differently based on whether or not it was accepting contingent
commissions for a given transaction.
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information to the insurer.180 By going to the NCC intermediary, by contrast,
RH types can attempt to hide their true status. Contrast this with RL types, who
actually gain from credibly communicating their true risk status to insurers, and
who therefore have an affirmative incentive to purchase insurance from a CC
intermediary. Countervailing factors, most notably the risk of receiving biased
advice due to steering, may, of course, counteract this effect. But so long as any
countervailing forces equally affect both RH and RL types, insurers can
rationally infer that a higher percentage of RH than RL types will prefer NCC
intermediaries, and a higher percentage of RL than RH types will prefer CC• - • 181
intermediaries. Insurers, knowing this, will set their premiums accordingly
and will impose a surcharge for the purchase of insurance through an NCC
intermediary.
This "surcharge" decreases the extent to which informed purchaser choices
reveal actual purchaser preferences. The reason is that the cost insurers add to
purchases through an NCC intermediary is not tethered to the actual costs
associated with that choice. To see why this matters, consider a low residual
risk insured (RL) who, if given the choice between banning contingent
commissions and mandating them, would prefer a ban because of the possible
costs associated with steering. Even though this insured is RL, he or she would
prefer to be lumped together with all insureds and treated as having an average
risk level (Ro) rather than pay the costs associated with steering and be
recognized as a genuine RL. But when given the choice between these two
options in the marketplace, this insured might nonetheless choose to purchase
insurance from a CC intermediary because purchasing from an NCC
intermediary would falsely signal that the insured had a high residual risk level,
resulting in the insured paying a higher premium than would be paid by an
average risk (Ro).
B. Mimicry: A New Adverse Selection Model for Sophisticated Insurance
Markets
As noted above, the core defense of contingent commissions-that they
reduce adverse selection-has some traction in sophisticated insurance
markets, where there are fewer reasons to be skeptical about the importance of
adverse selection. 182 But even in these sophisticated insurance markets,
contingent commissions may fail to improve adverse selection problems
180. This is not true, of course, if RH types can hide their risk status when dealing with CC
intermediaries. The implications of such deception are considered infra Section III.B.
181. In theory, if the costs of steering were sufficiently high for all insureds, then both RH and RL
types would go to NCC intermediaries. This result is unlikely given that different insureds are likely to
weigh the costs of steering differently. In any event, this result would be the functional equivalent of
banning contingent commissions, and so does not undermine the analysis.
182. See supra notes 143-152 and accompanying text.
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significantly. To make this argument, this Section expands on the model of
contingent commission payments presented above, but adds an additional
assumption-that RH insureds can, for a cost, mimic RL insureds when
interacting with intermediaries. This assumption is first explained and justified
in Subsection 1. The model, which is developed in Subsection 2, suggests that
RH insureds may choose to purchase insurance through CC intermediaries and
to mimic RL insureds strategically in a way that both creates new social costs
and mitigates the capacity of contingent commissions to reduce adverse
selection. Under the model, contingent commissions shift, rather than
eliminate, the informational barrier that causes adverse selection. In other
words, while contingent commissions encourage the free flow of information
between insurers and intermediaries, they simultaneously discourage the free
flow of information between insurance purchasers and intermediaries.
1. The Mimicry Assumption
Sophisticated insurance purchasers ordinarily have a clear incentive to be
honest with their insurance brokers or independent agents. Independent
insurance intermediaries help "buyers to identify their coverage and risk
management needs and [match] buyers with appropriate insurers. ' These
risk-management services are particularly important for sophisticated insurance
purchasers, who tend to have complicated risk-management needs. If these
potential insureds are not truthful and forthright about their potential liabilities,
then their intermediaries will not be capable of providing these services. An
intermediary's capacity to identify an insured's vulnerabilities and to offer
concrete methods for reducing risk is obviously compromised when insureds
withhold complete and accurate risk information. Similarly, if insureds are not
completely forthright about their risk profiles, their agents or brokers may be
unable to recommend or investigate truly comprehensive insurance options. In
fact, many endorsement options are specifically designed so that they will be
particularly appealing to relatively high-risk insureds. 184 Intermediaries that do
not know that an insured is relatively high-risk will have little reason to
investigate or recommend these endorsements.
When intermediaries receive contingent commissions, however, insurance
purchasers' ordinary incentive to be truthful with their brokers or agents may
be overwhelmed by a contrary incentive. In the model outlined above, informed
and sophisticated insurance purchasers will understand that an agent or broker
who receives contingent commissions may disclose otherwise unobservable
183. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 2, at 360.
184. This is the classical solution to the adverse selection problem pioneered by Rothchild and
Stiglitz. See Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 72, at 643.
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risk information to insurers.1 85 For this reason, informed RH insureds may have
an incentive to hide their residual risk level when they purchase insurance
through a CC intermediary. By mimicking an RL insured and purchasing
insurance through a CC intermediary, the high residual risk insured may be
able to receive a discounted premium from the insurer: the CC intermediary,
believing the customer to be RL, will signal this misunderstanding to the
insurer, who will charge the incognito RH customer a low premium.
In many cases, determined RH insurance purchasers will be able to
successfully mimic RL insureds when interacting with intermediaries. To do so,
the insured need not alter verifiable or easily observable facts-any such
information is presumably observable by insurers directly and is thus not part
of the insured's residual risk.1 86 Rather, the insured would merely need to alter
evidence relevant to residual risk, meaning evidence that the insurer would not
observe without the input of the intermediary. For instance, the insurance
purchaser might fail to mention idiosyncratic risks about which the producer
did not directly inquire. The normally nonchalant businessman might well put
on a front of hyper-vigilance for his visits to his broker. If this proved
impossible, he might send a particularly safety-minded subordinate to meet
with the broker or agent. In cases in which a broker or agent had historical
knowledge of the company's poor safety habits, the insured could switch
intermediaries and wipe the slate clean. Such deception is likely to be
successful because an intermediary's comparatively superior knowledge about
an insured depends almost exclusively on his or her direct interactions with the
insured. 187
Of course, these efforts at mimicry would be costly for insurance
purchasers. First, and most obviously, mimicry would require the additional
effort of strategizing about how to mimic an RL insured. Second, insureds who
did mimic would forego at least some of the risk mitigation advice that
independent intermediaries provide to their clients. Third, as noted above,
insureds who camouflage their risk levels potentially forego receiving advice
about desirable endorsements or alternative policy options.
2. The Consequences of Mimicry
To understand the circumstances under which RH insureds will rationally
choose to mimic RL insureds and the consequences of such mimicry, consider
185. To the extent that even sophisticated insurance purchasers do not understand this, there is even
more reason to believe that steering is a significant problem and that contingent commissions genuinely
decrease the quality of insurance that these purchasers ultimately receive. See supra Section II.B
(discussing how, even assuming that insureds understand the implications of an intermediary's
contingent commission disclosure, they still may be steered to inefficient coverage).
186. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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the following extensions of the model introduced in Section A. Suppose that
the actuarially fair premium for all insureds, when insurers cannot distinguish
between residual risk types, is P. For RL insureds, the actuarially fair premium
is reduced by an amount D (for a total of P-D) and for RH insureds, it is
increased by D (for a total of P+D).188 Insureds that purchase through a CC
intermediary must pay a cost, S, in addition to their premium, which represents
the potential that they will be "steered" to a low-quality insurance arrangement
for a given price. This might include relatively less comprehensive coverage, a
less financially secure insurer, or an insurer with a bad reputation for claims
payment. 189 Because insureds have variable insurance needs and information
about those needs, the size of S is assumed to vary among both RH and RL
insureds.
Only CC intermediaries can credibly communicate information to insurers
about an insured's residual risk. RH insureds, however, may not be forthright
about their residual risk level, and they are capable of either revealing their true
residual risk level to brokers or mimicking the risk level of an RL insured.
Intermediaries cannot distinguish between actual RL insureds and RH insureds
who mimic low-risk status. To mimic an RL insured, high-risk insureds must
pay a cost X that reflects the costs of changed behavior, decreased risk
mitigation advice, and the possibility of foregoing desirable endorsement or
alternative policy options.190 Again, because insureds will have different
insurance needs and information about those needs, the cost of X will differ
among RH insureds. These basic parameters, including those introduced
above,' 9' are summarized below:
RL < Ro
RH> R0
For RL, Premium = P-D




CC: can communicate the insured's residual risk level
NCC: cannot communicate the insured's residual risk level
S: Increased steering cost an insured pays for a CC intermediary (varies among
insureds)
X: Amount RH must pay to mimic RL (varies among RH insureds)
Given these basic parameters, consider how insurers and purchasers will
respond. First, note that insurers will only set two premiums: one for insureds
who purchase insurance through an NCC intermediary, and one for insureds
188. As above, there are an equal number of RH and RL insureds.
189. Even if the insurance customer can prevent these outcomes through monitoring, such
monitoring is presumably not free, and S can thus represent these costs. Additionally, S captures the
theoretical possibility that producers will tend to be less aggressive in seeking payment for their clients'
claims when they receive contingent commission payments. See supra note 41.
190. See supra Subsection IiI.B.I.
191. See supra Section III.A.
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who purchase insurance from a CC intermediary who reports that a purchaser
appears to be RL. Insurers will not set a third premium for insureds who
purchase insurance from a CC intermediary reporting that a purchaser appears
to be RH. The reason is that RH insureds will never reveal their true status to a
CC intermediary. Doing so would lead the CC intermediary to tell the insurer
about RH's high-risk status, causing the insured to pay the premium P+D.
Instead, it will always be a better option (though not always the best), for the
RH insured to purchase through NCC intermediaries, who cannot communicate
residual risk levels. Because insurers do not receive any credible information
about the residual risk level from NCC intermediaries, they would not know
that P+D was the actuarially fair amount to charge. Even if most customers of
NCC intermediaries were RH----as Section III.A predicts-the insurer could not
presume that they all were; at least some RL purchasers would choose to
purchase through an NCC broker if they viewed S to be large, and thus the
actuarially fair premium for insurance purchased through an NCC broker would
have to be less than P+D.
Second, note that insurers, in setting premiums, can partially induce self-
sorting by RL and RH types if they charge a lower premium to insureds who
purchase through CCs than those who purchase through NCCs. Both RL and
RH insureds will always prefer to purchase insurance from an NCC unless they
can receive a lower premium through a CC: purchasing through a CC imposes
cost S, and there is no countervailing benefit unless the price of insurance is
lower. 192 But insurers can induce some insureds to purchase insurance through
a CC intermediary by charging a lower premium, which will offset the cost of S
for some insureds. This group of insureds who purchase from a CC in response
to a decrease in premiums will consist primarily of RL rather than RH types. The
reason is straightforward: the total cost to RL insureds of purchasing through a
CC intermediary will be less than for RH insureds because the RH insureds must
pay X, the cost of mimicking, if they purchase through a CC. (Recall from
above that it will never be sensible for RH to purchase from a CC and not to
mimic.) By contrast, both RL and RH pay precisely the same cost when they
purchase through an NCC intermediary, as that intermediary cannot credibly
signal any residual risk information to the insurer.
Based on these conclusions, the insurer's optimal pricing strategy will be to
charge a premium P-A (for some A such that A <D) for insureds who purchase
through CC intermediaries, and to charge a premium P+B (for some B such
that B<D) for insureds who purchase through NCC intermediaries. This
strategy is superior to either charging the same price to all insureds, or charging
a higher price to insureds who purchase through CC intermediaries, because
192. Notably, this is consistent with the possibility that contingent commissions reduce adverse
selection. To the extent that a CC intermediary can reduce adverse selection, purchasers will experience
this effect in a reduced premium.
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neither of those strategies achieves any advantage in appropriately pricing risk.
Moreover, the strategy is optimal when A and B are both less than D because
the pool of insureds who purchase from either type of intermediary will almost
certainly be heterogeneous. The only scenario in which the insurer could
achieve a complete separating equilibrium 93 is if the premium discount for CC
intermediaries over NCC intermediaries outweighed all RL'S valuations of S,
but did not outweigh any RH's valuations of S+X. Because different insureds
value S and X differently under the model's assumptions, such a separating
equilibrium does not occur. This analysis is presented visually, in the following
figure:
















" P = Premium for average risk insured
* D = Actuarially fair change in premium based on risk level
" X = Penalty for mimicry
• S = Steering cost
* B = Surcharge for purchasing from non-contingent commission broker
* A = Bonus for purchasing from contingent commission broker
193. In a separating equilibrium, all purchasers of different types choose different options, thus
fully revealing their type indirectly. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 140-
47(1994).
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As this simple model clarifies, RH insureds will tend to mimic RL insureds if P-
A+X+S < P+B. By simple arithmetic, this reduces to X+S < B+A. Thus, RH
insureds will mimic if the difference in premiums between CC and NCC
intermediaries (i.e., B+A) is larger than the cost of steering (S) plus the cost of
mimicry (X). When this is the case, RH insureds will find it profitable to incur
the costs of both S and X.
Moreover, mimicry results in potentially substantial social costs and
mitigates the capacity of contingent commissions to reduce adverse selection.
All of the costs of mimicry (X) and some of the costs of steering (S) are social
as well as private costs: overall social welfare decreases when insureds
undertake costly measures to change their behavior, forego valuable risk
mitigation advice, chance purchasing insufficient insurance, or purchase
insurance that is of poor quality. Simultaneously, the private benefit to RH of
mimicking RL-the premium reduction of B+A-is not a social benefit and
actually limits the capacity of contingent commissions to mitigate adverse
selection. 194 Indeed, under the model, RH insureds never reveal their status to
CC brokers or agents, meaning that these agents never have any information to
reveal to insurers. Importantly, adverse selection does decrease in the model,
but not for the reason highlighted by other writers or to the extent that these
writers have suggested. Instead, adverse selection only decreases because
insureds who purchase through a CC intermediary are more likely to be low-
risk than insureds who purchase through an NCC intermediary, allowing
insurers to address adverse selection by charging higher premiums to the latter
group of insureds. But this method for reducing adverse selection is limited: it
only allows insurers to improve their information imperfectly, by making
potentially incorrect inferences about insureds' residual risk levels based on
their purchasing decisions.
Ultimately, the model suggests that the costs of mimicry, even ignoring the
cost of steering, may exceed the benefits of reduced adverse selection. Offering
sophisticated purchasers a choice about how their intermediaries are
compensated may induce high-risk insureds to take socially costly measures in
order to transfer wealth from low-risk insureds to themselves. The opportunity
to mimic a low-risk insured (and therefore to receive a lower premium) may be
an enticing benefit for the high-risk insured, but it is actually a social cost.
194. Note that in the model, as observed supra Section IlIl.A, insureds may well prefer a system in
which contingent commissions are banned to one in which they have the choice of CC or NCC
intermediaries. In a world without contingent commissions, low-risk insureds, like high-risk insureds,
pay a premium P for insurance. Compare this with the equilibrium result in a world with disclosure:
low-risk insureds have the choice of paying premium P+B or P-A+S. If S>A, then low-risk insureds are
unambiguously worse off in a world where contingent commissions are available as compared to a
world in which such payments are banned. The same reasoning applies to high-risk insureds: following
the same logic as above, they will be worse off if X+S>A. In other words, if low-risk insureds are worse
off, then so too are high-risk insureds.
Vol. 25:289, 2007
Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions
Indeed, it allows high-risk insureds partially to undo the benefits of reduced
adverse selection that proponents of contingent commissions have identified.
To accomplish this feat, high-risk insureds must incur a number of real costs
associated with convincing their broker that they are low-risk insureds.
C. A Possible Need for Intervention in Sophisticated Insurance Markets
The preceding analysis suggests that, under a plausible set of assumptions,
contingent commission payments may reduce the efficiency of commercial
insurance markets, even though insurance purchasers in these markets are both
informed and rational. First, it explains how even informed insurance
purchasers may opt for the services of an intermediary that accepts contingent
commissions in order to signal to insurers that they view themselves to be low-
risk. The fact that these informed purchasers rely on contingent commission
intermediaries does not, therefore, prove that this is the efficient market
outcome. In fact, as Section B has explained, the costs of contingent
commission payments in these markets are not limited to the prospect of
steering. Sophisticated insurance purchasers, knowing that intermediaries who
receive contingent commissions have an incentive to communicate risk
information to insurers, may choose to purchase insurance through a broker or
agent that accepts contingent commissions while masking information
suggesting that they are relatively high-risk. High-risk insureds' "mimicry" of
low-risk insureds not only undermines the capacity of contingent commissions
to reduce adverse selection, but it creates additional social costs: it impedes the
intermediary's ability to offer his or her clients risk-mitigation advice or to
suggest appropriate coverage options.
The policy implications of these theoretical models, of course, are unclear
and require empirical work testing the assumptions and predictions of the
competing theoretical models. Two predictions, in particular, could be tested
based on the theoretical model above. First, Section A has predicted that
insureds who purchase through intermediaries that have disclaimed contingent
commissions will pay premiums that are higher than what they otherwise
would have paid. Second, Section B has predicted that high-risk insureds will
be less forthcoming with contingent commission intermediaries than they are
with intermediaries that disclaim contingent commissions. Because almost all
intermediaries accepted contingent commission payments from some insurers
until 2004, the possibility of testing these propositions has only recently
emerged. Empirical work in this area is, therefore, both an exciting and
promising frontier for research.
CONCLUSION
Attorney General (now Governor) Spitzer's opening salvoes against
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contingent commissions held the promise of reshaping the relationship between
insurers and independent intermediaries. In the last two years, however,
insurers, brokers, independent agents, and academics have turned the tide,
transforming accusations of fraud in core industry practices into a mere
requirement that insurance consumers be shown one more standardized form.
Unfortunately, such disclosure will do little to limit the risks of steering in
consumer markets. Disclosure may alert consumers to the fact that their
intermediaries have a potential conflict of interest, but it will not equip them to
limit the consequences of this conflict of interest, in light of the inherent
informational asymmetries existing between insurance consumers and
intermediaries. Lawmakers must weigh these costs against the theoretical
possibility that contingent commissions reduce adverse selection, a problem
that empirical evidence suggests is insignificant in consumer insurance
markets. The resulting cost-benefit analysis provides a strong case for going
beyond disclosure in consumer insurance markets-and perhaps even banning
contingent commission payments in all their manifestations.
By contrast, the optimal regulatory solution is unclear when it comes to
sophisticated insurance markets, where insurance purchasers can meaningfully
be informed about contingent commissions. There are, however, theoretical
reasons to believe that even in these insurance markets, disclosure is too limited
a response. Insurance purchasers might well make market choices that do not
reflect their actual preferences regarding the desirability of contingent
commissions. This result may exacerbate adverse selection and may create
additional social costs. Although it is too early to embrace regulatory oversight
of contingent commissions in sophisticated insurance markets, it is also
premature to assume that market forces will produce efficient results.
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